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REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO
SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1595 (2005)
Detlev Mehlis
Commissioner 19 October 2005
UNIIIC
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. The Security
Council, by its resolution 1595 of 7 April 2005, decided to
establish an international independent investigation
Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese
authorities in their investigation of all aspects of the
terrorist attack which took place on 14 February 2005 in
Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik
Hariri and others, including to help identify its
perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.
2. The
Secretary-General notified the Council that the Commission
began its full operations with effect from 16 June 2005. The
Commission was granted an extension to the initial period of
investigation mandated by the Council, until 26 October
2005.
3. During the course
of its investigation, the Commission received extensive
support from the Government of Lebanon and benefited from
expert inputs from a number of national and international
entities.
4. The main lines of
investigation of the Commission focused on the crime scene,
technical aspects of the crime, analysis of telephone
intercepts, the testimony of more than 500 witnesses and
sources, as well as the institutional context in which the
crime took place.
5. The full case file
of the investigation was transmitted to the Lebanese
authorities during October 2005.
6. The present report
sets out the main lines of enquiry of the investigation
conducted by the Commission, its observations thereon, and
its conclusions, for the consideration of the Security
Council. It also identifies those matters on which further
investigation may be necessary.
7. It is the
Commission’s view that the assassination of 14 February 2005
was carried out by a group with an extensive organization
and considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had
been prepared over the course of several months. For this
purpose, the timing and location of Mr. Rafik Hariri’s
movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his
convoy recorded in detail.
8. Building on the
findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to
date and on the basis of the material and documentary
evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there
is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian
involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact
that Syrian Military Intelligence had a pervasive presence
in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian
forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior
security officials of Lebanon were their appointees. Given
the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the
Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem,
it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a
complex assassination plot could have been carried out
without their knowledge.
9. It is the
Commission’s conclusion that the continuing investigation
should be carried forward by the appropriate Lebanese
judicial and security authorities, who have proved during
the investigation that with international assistance and
support, they can move ahead and at times take the lead in
an effective and professional manner. At the same time, the
Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s
ramifications including bank transactions. The 14 February
explosion needs to be assessed clearly against the sequence
of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there
could be links between some, if not all, of them.
10. The Commission is therefore of
the view that a sustained effort on the part of the
international community to establish an assistance and
cooperation platform together with the Lebanese authorities
in the field of security and justice is essential. This will
considerably boost the trust of the Lebanese people in their
security system, while building self-confidence in their
capabilities.
CHRONOLOGY OF
EVENTS, MID 2004
- 26 August 2004, Rafik Hariri
meets in Damascus with Syrian President Bashar Assad to
discuss the extension of the term of President Lahoud.
- 2 September 2004, the United
Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1559 concerning
the situation in the Middle East, calling for the withdrawal
of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
- 3 September 2004, the Rafik Hariri
bloc approves the extension law for President Lahoud.
- 3 September 2004, the Lebanese
parliament adopts the extension law for President Lahoud and
forwards it to the Lebanese government for execution.
- 7 September 2004, Economy Minister
Marwan Hamadeh, Culture Minister Ghazi Aridi, Minister of
Refugee Affairs Abdullah Farhat and Environment Minister
Fares Boueiz, resigned from the cabinet in protest at the
constitutional amendment.
- 9 September 2004, Prime Minister
Rafik Hariri indicates to journalists that he will resign.
- 1 October 2004, Assassination
attempt on Marwan Hamadeh, in Beirut, Lebanon.
- 4 October 2004, Rafik Hariri
resigns as prime minister.
- 11 October 2004, Syrian President
Bashar Assad delivers a speech condemning his critics within
Lebanon and the United Nations.
- 19 October 2004, United Nations
Security Council expresses concern that resolution 1559 has
not been implemented.
- 20 October 2004, President Lahoud
accepts Hariri's resignation and names Omar Karame to form
the new government.
CHRONOLOGY OF
EVENTS, SEPTEMBER 2005
- 14 February 2005, Rafik Hariri and
22 other individuals are killed in a massive blast in a
seafront area of central Beirut.
- 25 February 2005, the United
Nations Fact-Finding Mission arrives in Lebanon.
- 8 March 2005, Hezbollah organizes a
one million strong “pro-Syrian” march.
- 14 March 2005, a
Christian/Sunni-led counter demonstration demands the
withdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief of
the security and intelligence services.
- 19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in
Jdeideh, a northern suburb of Beirut, wounding 11 people.
- 23 March 2005, three people are
killed and three others wounded in an explosion in the
Kaslik shopping centre, north of Beirut.
- 25 March 2005, the United Nations
Fact-Finding Mission issues its report in New York.
- 26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb
explodes in an industrial zone in northeast Beirut, injuring
six.
- 1 April 2005, nine people are
injured in an underground garage in an empty commercial and
residential building in Broumana.
- 7 April 2005, the Security Council
forms the United Nations International Independent
Investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafik
Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005.
- 19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime
Minister Najib Mikati announces that parliamentary elections
will be held on 30 May 2005.
- 22 April 2005, General Jamil Al-Sayyed,
head of the Internal Security Forces and General Ali
Al-Hajj, head of the Sûreté Générale, decide to put their
functions at the disposal of Prime Minister Najib al Makati.
- 26 April 2005, the last Syrian
troops leave Lebanon ending a 29 year military presence.
- 26 April 2005, the United Nations
Verification Mission starts its mission to verify the
complete withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence
agents from Lebanon and its full compliance with the
resolution 1559.
- 6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in
Jounieh north of Beirut injuring 29 people.
- 7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to
adopt the proposed changes to the electoral law of 2000.
- 30 May 2005, the first round of the
elections was held. The Rafik Hariri Martyr List, a
coalition of Saad Hariri's Future Movement, the Progressive
Socialist Party and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, won the
majority of the seats in Parliament.
- 2 June 2005, journalist Samir
Kassir is killed when his car explodes in east Beirut.
- 21 June 2005, former Lebanese
Communist Party leader George Hawi is killed when his car
explodes close to his home in Wata Musaytbeh.
- 30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former
finance minister under Rafik Hariri, forms the new
government composed of 23 ministers.
- 12 July 2005, Defence Minister
Elias Murr is wounded and two other people are killed in a
car bomb attack in Beirut.
- 22 July 2005, at least three people
are wounded near rue Monot when a bomb explodes in the
Ashrafieh quarter.
- 22 August 2005, three persons are
injured in an explosion in a garage near the Promenade Hotel
in the Al-Zalqa area north of Beirut.
- 16 September 2005, one person is
killed and ten others wounded by a bomb near a bank in
Ashrafieh.
- 19 September 2005, one person is
killed and two wounded in a small explosion at the Kuwaiti
information office in Beirut.
- 25 September 2005, a car bomb
injures prominent news anchor, May Chidiac, in north Beirut.
I. PREFACE
1. The present report
details progress made in the implementation of Security
Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted on 7
April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February
2005 terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty two others,
reiterating its call for the strict respect of Lebanon's
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity,
and noting the conclusions reached by an earlier
fact-finding mission (S/2005/203), decided to establish an
international independent investigation Commission
(hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the
Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects
of this terrorist act, in order to, among other things, help
identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and
accomplices.
2. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the Security
Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission
to Lebanon on the same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005.
The report reflected the outcome of a three-week enquiry,
including a set of recommendations. The fact-finding mission
was of the opinion that, since the credibility of the
Lebanese authorities conducting the investigation was
questioned, an international independent investigation
should be set up to establish the truth. For this purpose, a
team with executive authority needed to be created, covering
all the fields of expertise needed for such an
investigation. Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower
the fact finding mission was granted, its conclusions and
recommendations have been of considerable value to the
Commission.
3. In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the
Government of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security
Council's decision to establish an international commission
of inquiry as well as its readiness to cooperate with the
commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and
of its legal system.
4. Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive
consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing and its logistical support. On 26 May
2005, a small advance team headed by Commissioner Detlev
Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the
matter, from a temporary headquarters, the team endeavored
to create the support platform for its future work.
5. On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the
Lebanese judicial authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was signed between the Government of Lebanon and the
Commission. The MOU detailed the modalities of cooperation
between the two parties. Of particular importance to the
Commission was the agreement that “the Government of Lebanon
shall guarantee that the Commission is free from
interference in the conduct of its investigation, and is
provided with all necessary assistance to fulfill its
mandate.” The Commission was to determine its own
procedures, collect evidence, both documentary and physical,
meet and interview any civilians or/and officials it deemed
necessary and have unrestricted access to all premises
throughout the Lebanese territory, taking into account
Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese
authorities, for their part, were to assist the Commission
in its work by providing all documentary and material
evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses as
requested by the Commission.
6. On 16 June 2005,
the Secretary-General declared the Commission operational.
On 17 June 2005, a press conference was held by the
Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the
Lebanese authorities and to invite the Lebanese people to
help the Commission by relaying any information which might
be of interest to the investigation. Two hotlines were set
up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.
7. Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese
authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case
docket containing all the information and evidence collected
since 14 February 2005. Henceforth, the Commission conducted
a thorough criminal and judicial investigation in close
cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State
General Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police
(Internal Security Forces) authorities, in order to avoid
duplication, overlapping or contradictory measures.
8. The Commission established close links with the Lebanese
security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were
held, particularly with the judicial authorities, to
exchange updated information and files, share results and
plan for the emerging phases of the investigation. Most of
the witnesses interviewed by the Commission were summoned
through the Lebanese judicial and security authorities. A
case in point was the 30 August 2005 operation, in which
Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC investigators closely
coordinated the house raid and search of former senior
security officials, prior to their transfer under close
escort to the Commission's Main Operating Base (MOB) for
interviewing.
9. The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in
establishing the MOB, as well as a Forward Operating Base
(FOB) for the work of the Commission. Lebanese security
teams (police and military) worked hand in hand with the
Commission's security team to ensure the safety and security
of the staff and premises.
10. Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission executive
authority, the Commission to a large extent was supported by
the Lebanese judicial and security authorities during search
and raid operations. Moreover, although the Commission was
qualified to make proposals to the Lebanese authorities
regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the
assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the
Lebanese authorities to proceed with such actions.
11. From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one United
Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified
investigation carried forward in tandem by the Commission
and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese authorities have
steadily shown the capacity to take increasing
responsibility in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated
by the fact that they took the initiative of arresting
suspects, organizing raids and searches.
12. Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the
Lebanese people towards their security and judicial
authorities, UNIIIC has become a source of great expectation
and hope for change, as well as an “interface” between the
Lebanese people and their authorities. The two press
conferences, particularly the first one, in addition to the
interview of the first suspect, and the arrest of the former
senior security officials at the Commission's suggestion,
had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof that in the
eyes of the Commission, no one was above the law. This
boosted Lebanese confidence. More witnesses came forward as
the work of the Commission progressed. However, a number of
people insisted that their identity not be disclosed to the
Lebanese authorities.
13. There are other points worth highlighting. First, a
number of witnesses were fearful that they would be harmed
if it were known publicly that they were cooperating with
the Commission. For this reason, the Commission took great
care to ensure that witness interviews were conducted in a
confidential manner. Because the Commission credits the
concern that these individuals have for their safety, this
report will not reveal the identity of those interviewed.
Second, as is true in any investigation, witnesses often
provide information beyond the scope of the investigation
being conducted. The Commission has and will continue to
forward to Lebanese authorities all information related to
any criminal matter beyond the scope of the Commission's
investigation. Finally, the Commission interviewed people
whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the
direction to where the evidence would lead it, but in the
direction the particular individual(s) wanted the Commission
to go. The Commission dealt with these individuals and
situations by remaining focused on its single mission – to
follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to follow
the agenda of any particular person or entity.
14. Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view that,
once UNIIIC has delivered its report and closed down,
Lebanon will be “left alone”. A prevailing fear is that, in
the aftermath of the completion of UNIIIC's work, and sooner
rather than later, the Syrian security and intelligence
services will be back, orchestrating a “revenge campaign” in
a society which remains “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian
elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and assassination
attempts have been carried out with impunity; deliberate
rumors and prophetic media analyses have sustained this
state of mind and have deterred potential witnesses from
contacting UNIIIC.
15. Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer
information as the Commission's completion of its work
seemed imminent (25 October), it is fair to say that the
Lebanese people in general terms have been eager to come
forward to help the Commission carry out its work.
16. The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum,
particularly in Lebanon. It has been the Commission's
steadfast policy not to be drawn directly into a dialogue in
the Lebanese media, avoiding any escalation and staying
above any challenging or provocative statements. Both press
conferences were aimed at countering such speculation and
clarifying the status of the investigation. Inevitably,
their effect was short-lived.
17. To enhance transparency and broader cooperation, working
with the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest
political authorities abreast of developments in the
investigation, to the extent that such action did not call
into question the independent nature of the Commission nor
have a direct impact on the course of the investigation per
se.
18. During the course of its investigation, the Commission
had to face major logistical challenges. In this regard, the
extensive support and assistance of sister organizations of
the United Nations system and Interpol were invaluable in
the daily work of the Commission.
19. The international community, for its part, was always
prompt, when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This
assistance greatly facilitated the work of the Commission
and gave added value to its work. However, although
resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the
Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is to be regretted that no Member State
relayed useable information to the Commission. A number of
contacts led to mere exchanges of views and/or statements of
facts. It is the Commission's reading of the resolution that
the pertinent information envisaged by the Security Council
would have included among other things, intelligence
information that could have been submitted without any prior
request from the Commission.
20. Despite the human, technical and financial capacities
mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although
considerable progress has been made and significant results
achieved in the time allotted, the investigation of such a
terrorist act with multi-faceted international dimensions
and their ramifications normally needs months (if not years)
to be completed so as to be able to establish firm ground
for a potential trial of any accused individuals. It is of
the utmost importance to continue to pursue the trail both
within and outside Lebanon. The Commission's work is only
part of a broader process. Even as this report is being
written a significant arrest was made just a few days ago;
witness interviews are continuing and complex evidence
continues to be reviewed.
21. The Commission has established facts and identified
suspects on the basis of evidence gathered or available to
it. The Commission has checked and examined this evidence to
the best of its knowledge. Until the investigation is
completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed,
and an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is
set up, one cannot know the complete story of what happened,
how it happened and who is responsible for the assassination
of Rafik Hariri and the murder of 22 other innocent people.
Therefore, the presumption of innocence stands.
22. In producing this report the Commission has endeavored
to ensure that nothing it does or says undermines the
ongoing criminal investigation and any trials that may
follow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose all
the detailed elements and facts it has in its possession,
beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities. The
Commission has tried to set forth the facts and to present
the analysis of those facts in a way that most accurately
explains what happened, how it happened and who is
responsible.
II. BACKGROUND
23. Syria has long had
a powerful influence in Lebanon. During the Ottoman Empire,
the area that became Lebanon was part of an overall
administrative territory governed from Damascus. When the
countries were established in the aftermath of the First
World War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab
nationalists considered to be rightfully part of Syria.
Indeed, since the countries became independent, they have
never had formal diplomatic relations.
24. Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese
President Suleiman Franjieh in May 1976 in the early stages
of the latter's civil war. In the Taif Agreement, reached
among members of the Lebanese parliament, that ended the
civil war in 1989, inter alia, Lebanon thanked Syria for its
assistance in deploying its forces in the Lebanon. A
provision of the agreement called for Lebanon and Syria to
determine jointly the future redeployment of those forces. A
later agreement reached between the two countries in May of
1991 regarding cooperation, restated that provision. Syrian
forces withdrew in May 2005 in compliance with Security
Council resolution 1559 (2004).
Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria
25. The Commission's investigation has confirmed what many
in Lebanon have long asserted, that senior Syrian
intelligence officials had a powerful day-to-day and overall
strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The
apparent growing conflict between Mr. Hariri and senior
Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad,
was a central aspect of the information provided to the
Commission through interviews and documents. A meeting in
Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August
2004 appeared to bring the conflict to a head. In that
meeting, which allegedly lasted for 10-15 minutes, President
Assad informed Mr. Hariri, who was then Prime Minister, that
President Assad intended that Lebanon would extend the term
in office of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr.
Hariri opposed.
26. Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of a
meeting between Mr. Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign
Minister Walid Al-Moallem, provided the Commission with
sharply differing versions of what was said in that meeting.
A number of Lebanese witnesses – including then former
ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi, Druze leader and
head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblat,
parliament member Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri's son, Saad –
reported that Mr. Hariri told them that President Assad
brusquely informed him of the decision to extend President
Lahoud's term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your
[Mr. Hariri's] head and Walid Jumblat's” if Mr. Hariri (and
presumably Mr. Jumblat) did not agree to support the
extension of President Lahoud's term. Syrian officials
characterized the meeting differently. Syrian Foreign
Minister Farouk Sharaa and General Ghazali , head of Syrian
intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in positive
terms. General Ghazali told the Commission that Mr. Hariri
told him that President Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a
“friend,” and described a cordial, respectful meeting in
which President Assad consulted Mr. Hariri on the matter.
27. Following are
excerpts of interviews conducted by the Commission regarding
the 26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to
the Commission from Mr. Sharaa, and a portion of the
transcript of a taped conversation between Mr. Hariri and
Mr. Al-Moallem:
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic,
letter to the Commission of 17 August 2005:
“A meeting took place between President Bashar Assad and
late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in Damascus on August
26th, 2004 within the framework of the ongoing political
consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders. (…) A
general review was made of the local and regional
developments, including the possible extension of the
mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in view
of the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual
interest in maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-Hariri
requested that in case a consensus regarding the mandate
extension is reached in the Council of Ministers, Syria
should make endeavors to get President Lahoud to better
cooperate in the forthcoming period. The President requested
Mr. Hariri to consult with his group and with whom he deems
suitable and to take the appropriate position.”
Rustum Ghazali, undated written statement, submitted to the
Commission by letter of 17 August 2005:
“I had two meetings at Anjar on that date (26 August 2004)
with Prime Minister Hariri. The first was in the morning of
August 26th, 2004, on his way to Damascus to meet President
Bashar Assad in Damascus, and the second was on his return
trip from Damascus to Beirut after meeting with President
Bashar Assad in Damascus. The latter meeting was also held
in our office at Anjar.”
(…)
“We discussed his meeting with President Bashar Assad. He (Hariri)
looked relaxed. Prime Minister Hariri said that his meeting
with President Bashar Assad was cordial and brief. According
to Prime Minister Hariri, President Assad told him: Abu
Bahaa, we in Syria have always been dealing with you as a
friend and as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Today, I am
also dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister
of Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently
witnessed by this region, with Lebanon in the midst, we are
of the view that it is in the interest of Lebanon to
maintain the continuity of the regime by extending the term
of office of President Lahoud. As a friend, we would like
you to clarify your position regarding this matter. We are
in no hurry to know the answer, and you may wish to think
about it at your convenience.”
Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27
June 2005:
“On Wednesday 24 or 25 August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat and
Mr. Berri were all invited to go to Damascus in order to be
informed about the decision to extend Mr. Lahoud's mandate.
Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would need to
discuss it with President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that
the answer should be “yes” before setting up any
appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to respond
positively because this was a strategic matter for President
Assad. Mr. Jumblat's answer was negative. One hour later,
Mr. Jumblat called me and told me that the Syrian
Intelligence had cancelled his appointment.
In the evening, Mr. Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr.
Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali insisted that as long as his
answer was not positive, he would not confirm his
appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay in
his house (…) until further notice. The following day, he
was called in for a short meeting.”
(…)
“The day Mr. Hariri met with President Assad, I was meeting
at Mr. Jumblat's residence in Beirut, with Bassem Sabaa and
Ghazi Areedi. We saw that Mr. Hariri's motorcade was back by
1 PM which meant that the meeting in Damascus was pretty
short. We saw Mr. Hariri who looked tired. He was sweating.
He told the four of us that President Lahoud was to be
reelected or “he will have to pay a high price”. (…)He
reported President Assad saying to him: I will break Lebanon
on your head and Jumblat's head.”
Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July
2005:
“Mr. Hariri reported to us that President Assad told him:
“If Jacques Chirac puts me out of Lebanon, I will consider
different options and will let you know. Either you are with
us or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud for President. I
will make sure he is the President. I will wait for your
answer. (…) Tell Walid Jumblat that if he has Druze people
in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in Syria. I am
ready to do anything.”
Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28
June 2005:
“According to Mr. Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is me. I
want to renew his mandate. (…) If Chirac wants me out of
Lebanon, I will break Lebanon. (…) During his visit to my
house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed. He
was in a very bad position.”
Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25
June 2005:
“Later on, in 2004, when the issue of President Lahoud's
extension came up, Mr. Hariri also told me, that President
Assad had threatened him directly and told him, that voting
against the extension would be considered as being directed
against Syria. According to Mr. Hariri, President Assad
added that in that case they, the Syrians, would “blow him
up” and any of his family members and that they would find
them anywhere in the world.”
Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30
June 2005:
“When Mr. Hariri came back from his meeting with President
Assad, I met him at Walid Jumblat's house.”
(…)
“He reported to us President Assad's words who has put it
bluntly: “I am personally interested in this matter. It is
not about Emile Lahoud but about Bashar Assad”.
We asked him if he had had a chance to discuss the matter
with President Assad. He said that President Assad told him
that the matter was not open for discussion, that it was
bound to happen or else I will break Lebanon”(…). He was
extremely aggravated. He told me that for the sake of
Lebanon and its interests, he must think about what he will
do, that we are dealing with a group of lunatics who could
do anything.”
Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July
2005:
“I discussed with my father, the late Rafik Hariri, the
extension of President Lahoud's term. He told me that
President Bashar Assad threatened him telling him: “This is
what I want. If you think that President Chirac and you are
going to run Lebanon, you are mistaken. It is not going to
happen. President Lahoud is me. Whatever I tell him, he
follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will
break Lebanon over your head and Walid Jumblat's. (…) So,
you either do as you are told or we will get you and your
family wherever you are.”
Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with
Walid Al-Moallem on 1 February 2005:
“In connection with the extension episode, he (President
Assad) sent for me and met me for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that you are
with Syria. Now the time has come for you to prove whether
you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did not ask my
opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as
Prime Minister or as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just
said: “I have decided.” I was totally flustered, at a loss.
That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that he wished to extend Lahoud's
mandate. All he said was “I have decided to do this, don't
answer me, think and come back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was
asked: “Are you with us or against us?” That was it. When I
finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my body guard
looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”
28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri
complained that he believed that President Assad was being
deliberately misinformed by the Syrian security services and
Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated
excerpts of the meeting include the following statements by
Mr. Hariri:
? “I cannot live under a security regime that is specialized
in interfering with Hariri and spreading disinformation
about Rafik Hariri and writing reports to Bashar Assad.”
? “But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria. This will no
longer happen.”
29. During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri
that “we and the [security] services here have put you into
a corner.” He continued, “Please do not take things
lightly.”
30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr.
Al-Moallem's witness interview of 20 September 2005 in which
he falsely described the 1 February meeting as “friendly and
constructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the
questions put to him.
Syrian cooperation with the Commission
31. The information set forth above, and the evidence
collected by the Commission as described in the section
below entitled Planning of the Assassination, point to the
possibility that Syrian officials were involved in the
assassination of Mr. Hariri. When the Commission attempted
to get the cooperation of the Syrian Government in pursuing
these lines of the investigation, the Commission was met
with cooperation in form, not substance.
32. The initial contact between the Commission and the
Syrian authorities took place on 11 June 2005 when the
Commissioner sent a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister,
requesting a meeting with representatives of the Syrian
government. Mr. Sharaa replied on 11 July, pledging the
Syrian Government's support for the investigation in general
terms. On 19 July, the Commission asked to interview several
witnesses including the President of the Syrian Arab
Republic. On 26 August, at the request of the Syrian
government, a meeting took place between the Commissioner
and a representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, in
Geneva, Switzerland. At that meeting, the Commissioner was
given a letter containing written statements of four
witnesses. It was indicated that President Assad would not
be available for any interview. The Commissioner repeated
his request for direct witness interviews and was told that
the request was under consideration but that President Assad
would not be available to be interviewed.
33. On 30 August the Commission sent another request to the
Syrian Foreign Minister, requesting interviews of several
additional witnesses and suspects in Syria. The letter
requested the support of the Syrian government to search the
premises of the suspects. On 7 September Foreign Minister Sharaa informed the Commission in writing that while the
Commission's evidence was based on false testimony, his
Government agreed that the persons listed in the
Commission's requests of 19 July and 30 August, except for
President Assad, could be interviewed.
34. On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews were
discussed between the Commission and a representative of the
Syrian Foreign Ministry. The Commission expressed its wish
that the interviews should be held in a third country,
neither Lebanon nor Syria, which was refused. The Syrian
authorities insisted that the interviews take place in Syria
with the participation of Syrian officials. The interviews
took place between 20 and 23 September. Each interview was
conducted in the presence of the Legal Advisor to the Syrian
Foreign Affairs Ministry or another representative of the
Foreign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers, and at
times, an additional person whose affiliation was not
identified. At the end of the interview process, it was
apparent that the interviewees had given uniform answers to
questions. Many of those answers were contradicted by the
weight of evidence collected by the UNIIIC from a variety of
other sources. The Commission has not had the opportunity to
follow up on these interviews or pursue its investigation
regarding a possible Syrian involvement in the crime.
35. The Commission has concluded that the Government of
Syria's lack of substantive cooperation with the Commission
has impeded the investigation and made it difficult to
follow leads established by the evidence collected from a
variety of sources. If the investigation is to be completed,
it is essential that the Government of Syria fully cooperate
with the investigating authorities, including by allowing
for interviews to be held outside Syria and for interviewees
not to be accompanied by Syrian officials.
III. THE CRIME
36. On 14 February
2005 at approximately 1250 hrs, the former Lebanese Prime
Minister Rafik Hariri left the Nejmeh Square in Beirut going
back to the Kuraytem Palace. He traveled in a motorcade
comprising of 6 cars, together with his security detail and
Member of Parliament, Bassel Fleyhan.
37. When the motorcade
passed the St. George Hotel at Minae Al-Hosn Street a huge
explosion occurred and resulted in the death of Mr. Hariri
and others.
38. Shortly after the blast, the
Director of Al-Jazeera TV in Beirut received a telephone
call from a man who stated that the Nasra and Jihad Group in
Greater Syria claimed responsibility for the assassination
of Mr. Hariri. This message was broadcast shortly
thereafter.
IV. THE LEBANESE
INVESTIGATION
Initial Measures
39. To resolve a crime
of this magnitude requires strong management capacity, clear
roles, coordination and access to sufficient competency,
manpower, equipment and means of assistance. The following
brief outline reviews measures undertaken by the Lebanese
authorities in the period from the execution of the crime
until UNIIIC was established.
Investigative Judge
40. Primary Military
Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher was responsible for the
crime investigation during the period from 14 to 21 February
2005. On the latter date, a decision was taken by the
Lebanese Government that the crime was a terrorist act
targeting the Republic, which led to the case being
transferred to a new competent court of jurisdiction, the
highest Criminal Court in Lebanon, the Justice Council. A
consequence of this decision was that a new investigative
judge was appointed to lead the investigation, Judge Michel
Abou Arraj, the representative of the Prosecutor General’s
Office.
41. Judge Mezher
arrived at the crime scene less than an hour after the
blast, accompanied by Judge Jean Fahd from the Prosecutor
General’s Office. He has described the situation at the
crime scene as a chaos. His first decisions were to appoint
the Assistant Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb,
as the person in charge of the scene and to assign him the
task of removing all dead bodies and wounded people from the
scene, extinguish fires and, thereafter, to withdraw all
people from the scene and close it off (witness statement).
42. At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with all the involved bodies, both
from the Internal Security Forces and the Military,
comprising in total 10 officers. During the meeting Judge
Mezher distributed tasks for the different bodies and gave
further directions for the course of the investigation
(witness statement).
43. The
representatives from the Internal Security Forces during the
meeting were: General Aouar as the acting Commander of the
Judicial Police and Head of the Forensic Unit, General
Mulaeb as acting Commander of the Beirut Police Force,
General Salah Eid as the responsible person for the blast
site and Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman in the capacity of
the Head of the Information Division (witness statement).
44. After the meeting,
at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge Mezher returned to the
crime scene for a second time. He was not satisfied with his
observations at the crime scene, but hoped it should be
better the next day since responsibilities had been
distributed at the earlier meeting. The shortcomings
consisted mainly of lack of equipment, means of assistance
and experience. In addition, there was a lack of
communication between the various bodies involved, the
directions from the Investigative Judge were not followed
and he did not receive proper feed-back concerning the
progress in the investigation (witness statement).
45. During the period
of his functions as Investigative Judge, Judge Mezher
summoned approximately 10 people to his office for
interrogations, comprising staff from the St. George Hotel,
Mr. Hariri’s close protection officers, the father and
mother of Mr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses. He also, in
consultation with Judge Jean Fahd, took the decision to
request assistance from Switzerland regarding a forensic
expert team to assist the Lebanese authorities in the
investigation. When Judge Mezher left the function of
Investigative Judge, 21 February 2005, no sustainable
results had been achieved in the investigation.
46. The file was
handed over to the new Investigative Judge, Judge Abou
Arraj. Judge Abou Arraj was Investigative Judge for the
investigation from 22 February to 23 March 2005. He was
appointed by First Judge Tanios Khoury, at the Supreme
Council, and the file was registered at Abou Arraj’s office
on 22 February 2005 (witness statement). His first opinions
when reviewing the file, were that the crime had been a
terrorist attack that would require a long period of time
and extensive investigative measures to be undertaken, in
addition to the application of substantial resources. In his
opinion, all the initial investigative measures had been
performed in a professional and accurate way. He was
surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars. He did not
meet with Judge Mezher, but telephoned him whenever
clarifications were needed (witness statement).
47. During the period
of Judge Abou Arraj’s tenure as the Investigative Judge, the
following measures were undertaken (compiled notes case
file).
Date
Measures Affected persons
22 February • Recording of the lawsuit
24 February • Second Beirut Regional Detachment Record
• Inspection of St George’s
• A summary of all military writs
• Signing writs: Sûreté Générale , Internal Security Forces,
State Security, Intelligence
25 February • The writ of the of the Special Criminal
Investigation Section
• Investigations about the diggings in St George’s area
• The writ of the Special Criminal Investigation Section:
Notifications.
• Tayssir Abu Adass
and First Adjutant Maher Daouk
26 February • Several reports were received among them: The
inspection report and the report about moving the cars to
Helou Barracks + interrogating the guards
28 February •
Interrogation
• Statements of witnesses • Tayssir Abu Adass
• Maher Daouk, Hassan Mohamed Ajuz and Amer Khaled Shehadeh
28 February •
Subpoenaing
• Forensic Evidence
Department: Asking for the assistance of foreign experts.
• Rashid Hammud (at the hospital), Mohamed Queiny (former
Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s bodyguards) and Tamer Lahib.
1 March • Giving the
Head of the Fact finding mission to Lebanon FitzGerald the
permission to look into the investigations.
2 March •
Interrogations of two witnesses • Tamer Lahib and Mohamed
Queiny.
3 March • The reports
of Mitsubishi Company were received + the catalogue of the
Mitsubishi pick-ups + a list of the names of the parts and
pieces found at the explosion site + a map showing
(unclear).
• Doctor Kawas report regarding the examination of
Abdel-Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.
• A report was received from the Army Intelligence about
interrogations.
• The report of Doctor Hussein Chahrour regarding the
examination of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.
• Hussam Ali Mohsen, Ahmad Ammoura and Nabil Ghsoub
(unclear) regarding there relations with suspect Ahmad Abu
Adass (Note: they were not arrested).
5 March • Subpoenaing
witnesses (the first three were to be interrogated the 8th
of March 2005. The others on the 9th of March 2005.
• Engineer Makram Aouar, Hamad Mulaeb, Hussam Ali Mohsen,
Mahmoud Baydoun (officer in the Sûreté Générale ), Afifi
Abdallah Al-Hershi (unclear), Ghassan Ben Jeddou (Al-Jazeera
Channel).
7 March • Inspection
of the contents of the cardboard boxes (Dalal Dargham)
• Brigadier General Imad Kakour came and informed us about
the investigations and took a copy of the investigation
report, Ziad Ramadan was with him.
8 March • We received:
The DNA results and the maps of the crime scene.
10 March • The report
of Al-Bourj Squad regarding the search for Abdel Hameed
Ghalayini cadaver.
11 March • The
discussion of Lieutenant General Ziad Nasr + Captain Mitri
Namar.
• Convocation of Hussam Mohsen
• Convocation of the Palestinian Marwan Abdel-Wahhab Kattan
(unclear), 14/3/2005
14 March • Urging the
heads of the services not to remove rubbles.
• Statements of witnesses.
• Letter of the international Mission regarding the
completion of its work.
• Jack Chalitta, Ali Amhaz and Marwan Koubtan.
48. On 23 March 2005,
Judge Abou Arraj stepped down from the post of Investigative
Judge. The reason for this was the tense political
atmosphere at this particular time: a lot of mistrust was
being directed towards the Lebanese judiciary and criticism
being leveled at the manner of the investigation. In
addition, while in charge of the Hariri investigation, he
also had to discharge his normal functions. The case was
contaminated with political issues and during demonstrations
in Beirut on 14 March 2005, he heard people mentioning his
name in a critical manner (witness statement).
49. At the time he
left the post of Investigative Judge, the only achievement
in the investigation was the Mr. Abu Adass lead, despite
attempts to focus on the modus operandi of the explosion and
to get all experts involved to come up with one consensus
opinion (witness statement).
50. Judge Abou Arraj
was replaced by Investigative Judge Elias Eid, who as of
October 2005, is still in charge of the investigation.
Internal Security
Forces
51. On 14 February
2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the Head of the Internal
Security Forces (ISF). He was promoted to the post in
November 2004, allegedly appointed by the Syrians, he
stepped down from the post during spring 2005 in the
aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to
his statement, he was at his office when he was alerted
about the blast. He immediately went to the crime scene by
car. During the ride he called General Shahid Al-Khoury,
Chief of the Services and Operations Division within ISF,
who told him that it was a huge blast. General Al-Hajj then
ordered Mr. Khoury to send all responsible units to the
scene. The units comprised the Forensic Unit under the
command of General Hisham Aouar, the Explosives Unit under
the command of General Abdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the
Investigation Unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel
Fouad Othman. This was his only responsibility, to provide
sufficient resources. After the arrival of the Investigative
Judge, all ISF staff was under the command of the Judge and
General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the investigation
(witness statement).
52. In his opinion,
the problems at the scene were related to the presence of
too many different agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State
Security and Public Security.
53. Later that
afternoon, General Al-Hajj joined a meeting with the Higher Defence Council at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was
chaired by the President. Other participants were the
Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the
Minister of Economy, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister
of Public works, the Governor of Beirut and Commanders from
the various security agencies. The meeting discussed the
subject matter of the crime, its referral to the Judicial
Council, and the ramifications of the crime.
54. After the meeting
General Al-Hajj returned to his office: soon thereafter the
Al-Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad Abu
Adass claimed responsibility for the blast and the killing
of Mr. Hariri. From that time all available ISF resources,
except those occupied with the crime scene work, were
focused on the Abu Adass track.
Military
Intelligence
55. On 14 February
2005, General Raymond Azar was the Head of Military
Intelligence. He was promoted to the post in December 1998
and stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the
blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he
was alerted about the blast by Colonel Mohamed Fehmi, Head
of the Military Security Branch. He did not go to the crime
scene, but followed the case in detail from his office,
together with Colonel Albert Karam, the Chief of Beirut
Intelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and
General Ghazali about the blast at the time of its
occurrence (witness statement).
56. Personnel from
Military Intelligence (mainly specialists in the field of
explosives) visited the crime scene and conducted their part
of the examination. They confirmed that the type of
explosives used were TNT and the estimated amount to be some
300 kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the site was
handed over later to the ISF (General Hisham Aouar) and to
General Azar’s knowledge there were some metal fragments and
a gun. His opinion was that basically ISF, but also the
Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Judge, had
the overall responsibility for the crime investigation.
57. In the afternoon
of 14 February 2005, General Azar attended the meeting at
the Higher Defence Council. At the meeting, a presentation
was made about the assassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the
details that were available at that time. Each participant
presented his own point of view.
58. At a later stage,
his Directorate was assigned to focus on three elements:
- The videotape of
Ahmad Abu Adass
- The cellular communications that took place in the area of
the explosion
- The type and amount of explosives used.
Sûreté Générale
59. On 14 February
2005, Brigadier General Jamil Al-Sayyed was the Head of the
Sûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in December
1998 and stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of
the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his
statement, he was at his office when he heard the blast, but
thought that the noise was a result of Israeli air fighters
passing through the sound barrier. Somewhere between 1315
and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed him
of the blast and that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade had been the
target. He stayed at his office and no one from the Sûreté
Générale was sent to the scene. He called the President, the
Minister of the Interior and General Ghazali.
60. Later that
afternoon, General Al-Sayyed attended the meeting at the
Higher Defence Council. The meeting was focused on the
consequences in the near future on the ground. The
suggestions were submitted to the Government, which had a
meeting later the same evening.
61. On Tuesday morning, 15
February 2005, he got a phone call from a journalist from
Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up the Abu
Adass videotape. The tape was brought to him 16 February
2005. He made a copy and sent the original to the
Investigative Judge Abou Arraj.
Crime Scene
Investigation
ISF Report
62. As with any similar criminal case, prompt examination of
the crime scene and its surroundings is of paramount
importance for the outcome of the investigation. The officer
in charge of the crime scene, General Naji Mulaeb of the ISF,
arrived at the scene at 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005. He has
issued a report dated 3 March 2005, on the crime scene
examination conducted by the Lebanese authorities (General
Directorate of Internal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit,
Ref. No.: 95) stating the following:
“On implementation of investigation order issued by the
first investigating judge of the military court in Beirut
regarding the investigations and anything that can throw
light on the enquiry into the explosion which caused the
death of former Prime Minister Hariri and others.
Record: Investigation order issued by the first
investigating judge of the military court in Beirut
No23/2005 dated 14 February 2005.
Order from the General Department of Referrals No 207/1181
dated 15 February 2005.
On 14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion took
place in Beirut which the operations room reported as being
close to the St. George Hotel. All patrols were ordered to
go to the scene. I proceeded there and arrived within a few
minutes. Cars on both sides of the road in the vicinity were
ablaze and there was a lot of smoke. Civil defense, fire
brigade and Red Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took
action to put out the fire, gather the corpses and take the
wounded to hospital. The scene was chaotic, and security and
military personnel were mixed with civilians, firemen and
first aid personnel and civilians, newspaper journalists and
the media were all eager to get to the scene. I ordered all
the officers and police officers and patrols to do
everything necessary to maintain security corridors and to
take the requisite measures to safeguard the scene of the
crime and keep away onlookers and made the commander of the
second Beirut regional secretariat responsible for
implementation.
The preliminary indications are that the explosion took
place in the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri but the
outcome is not yet know.
Specialists in gathering evidence and explosives experts
began their work.
In addition to political and security officers, there came
to the scene a Government commissioner from the Military
Court with some support staff; and Rasheed Mezher, the first
investigating judge from the Military Court in Beirut, who
orally delegated me, in my capacity as officer in charge of
the police during the absence from 12 February 2005 of the
Police Commander on a mission abroad, or whoever I should
see fit, to undertake the investigations and anything that
could throw light on that explosion and to duly inform him.
The oral authorization would be followed up in writing.
As soon as the General Director of Internal Security arrived
at the scene, I informed him of all the above.
In accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation of
authority, I ordered Major Salah Eid to undertake the
necessary investigative procedures in his capacity as the
commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, within
the remit of which the explosion took place, and to keep me
informed.
The work of retrieving the corpses and taking the wounded to
hospital continued, as did the work of personnel from the
Central Office of Accidents and the explosive experts. A
complete sweep was made of the scene and the surroundings. A
team of engineers from the Lebanese Army came and took
samples from the scene in order to carry out tests
thereupon. An army detachment carried out a search of the
site and buildings and assisted in imposing a security
cordon.
In view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent
telegram No. 2065 dated 14 February 2005 to the leadership
of the regional police unit and to police unit commanders in
which we asked that all the necessary investigations should
be carried out within the remit of each unit with respect to
the corpses that had been taken to the hospitals in each
area, in order to permit their relatives to identify them
and duly inform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval
of the relevant authorities for the return to their
relatives of those corpses. Depositions were to be taken
from the wounded and a copy deposited in the file of the
overall investigation, through the Al- Burj squad.
Further to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005,
sent to unit departments regarding the isolation of the
scene of the crime and establishment of a security cordon
around it, we ordered the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat to use whatever personnel were
necessary to perform those tasks and to place metal
barricades and yellow tape around the scene and, in
coordination with the commander of the traffic secretariat,
to ensure the flow of traffic.
Major Eid kept me informed of the progress of the
investigation and its outcome, and I duly informed the first
investigating judge from the Military Court. The corpses
were handed over to their relatives in accordance with legal
principles.
On the instructions of the first investigating judge of the
Military Court, and with the approval of the General
Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars from the
Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou barracks, once they
had been photographed in situ and a video recording had been
made in the presence of the commander of the second Beirut
regional secretariat, the commander of the second Beirut
traffic squad, the commander of the Al-Burj detachment and a
squad of criminal investigators, and using the lights
provided by the civil defense, in accordance with report No.
144/302 dated 14 February 2005. They were deposited in the
Helou barracks.
In our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to the
commander of the emergency services, we requested that they
should be safeguarded and that no-one should be allowed to
touch them.
At 1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi, the
commander of the Beirut police unit, reported and assumed
his command. He informed me of all the procedures that had
been taken and all incidents that had occurred, and we
followed up the process of the investigation being
undertaken by Major Salah Eid. We then duly informed the
first investigating judge of the Military Court of the same.
Pursuant to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005, the
unit commander transferred to us the written delegation of
authority issued by the first investigating judge of the
Military Court Ref 23/2005 dated 14 February 2005 concerning
the explosion, which was transmitted to us for
implementation by the General Directorate as No. 2SH207/1181
dated 15 February 2005.
Similarly, the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant No.
206/1735 dated 18 February 2005, written authorization from
that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which
included an order to keep the cars from the Hariri motorcade
inside the barracks, cover them with tents and place them
under guard, which was done.
In accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18 February
2005, The first investigating judge of the Military Court
have us written authorization Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February
2005, which included an order to contact the Governor of
Beirut, who should supply us with the names of those
recently working at a workshop at the site of the explosion.
The aforementioned authority was carried out by means of a
document of 14 pages which is attached.
Pursuant to the first delegation of authority referred to
above; on the basis of the order to the commander of the
second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out the
investigation; and as a result of the first report, No.
302/143 dated 14 February 2005 and all the investigations
arranged by the units in the police unit and the regional
police unit, we hereby submit the following:
Table No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses that
have been returned to their relatives.
Table No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons injured
by this explosion.
Table No. 3 contains the depositions that were made
concerning the explosion.
A table has been prepared showing the measures that were
taken: an examination of the scene of the crime; articles
impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one person at the site
of the explosion and the failure to find him.
All those procedures have been verified in report No. 302/1
dated 14 February 2005”.
Swiss Forensic Report
63. The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene
examination, representing a variety of different agencies,
came up with different opinions on the findings and results
of the examination. As a result, they were summoned to a
meeting at the Military Court in the presence of the
Prosecutor General (witness statement). The meeting led to a
request from the Lebanese authorities for foreign assistance
in examining the crime scene, which was directed to the
Government of Switzerland. A Swiss forensic expert team
visited Lebanon in March 2005 and conducted a forensic
investigation. The team's final report stated (excerpt):
“Our conclusions about an explosion above or under ground
are based upon the following examinations:
- Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size and
shape of fragments
- Interpretations based on size and shape of crater
- Ballistic interpretations
- Interpretations of damages on buildings (structure, glass)
After interpretation and analysis of the dispersion of
fragments, we can't give clear evidence whether there was an
explosion above or under ground. Our analysis and research
concerning the shape and form of the crater also gives no
clear evidence whether there was an explosion above or under
ground.
On the other hand, the form and shape of the crater gives
some information about the possible amount of the charge
(above or under ground):
- As mentioned in our report it is expected that an amount
of about 1000 kg above ground will create a crater like the
one on the scene
(…)
Concerning the fact that the charge was possibly placed in a
car, it must have been of larger size. If such a vehicle has
been used we expect some big fragments (e.g. from the frame)
of the vehicle close to the center of the explosion.
The grade of damage of the metal fragments which were shown
to us by the police (said to be originated of a Mitsubishi
Canter) is consistent with fragments we would expect if such
a vehicle was located in the center of the explosion.
(…)
After having conducted all the analysis and discussions of
the facts we have collected, we came to the conclusion that
it was most likely an explosion above ground.
According to this finding we estimate an amount of 1000kg of
high explosive.
The unconfirmed and preliminary results of the analysis of a
soil sample of the crater showed Trinitrotoleune (TNT) as
explosive charge”.
Rifi Report
64. In March 2005, the present Head of the ISF, General
Ashraf Rifi, prepared a report on the initial measures
undertaken by the competent Lebanese authorities on the
scene of the crime, which was submitted to the UN Fact
Finding Mission. The report concluded (excerpt):
II. Measures taken:
The importance of this tragic event that led to the
assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had an
effect on all subsequent measures and actions taken.
A. Rescue and evacuation operations and
find of bodies:
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, security,
military and civil defense organs as well as the Red Cross
rushed to the crime scene to perform their duties. In spite
of all the measures taken, these were, unfortunately, not up
to the level that would save the face of these organs. These
measures were flawed. Therefore, the Minister of Interior
and Municipalities issued a memorandum 137/(sad)2, dated 25
February 2005, instructing the General Inspectorate of the
Internal Security Forces to investigate the deeds and
actions. Based on the results, he suggested the dismissal of
both the General, Chief of Beirut Police and the General,
Chief of the Judicial Police.
B. Preservation of the crime scene:
Immediately after the explosion happened, the military
investigating judge was put in charge of the investigation.
Al the security and judicial police personnel were put at
his disposal. He gave rogatory commissions and stipulated
the kind of measures to be carried out, especially the
preservation of the crime scene. However, the measures taken
were below the required level and contrary to the obvious
fundamental basis upon which crimes as serious as this one
or even less serious crimes are investigated, in which case,
strict measures ought to be taken in order to prevent any
tampering with the crime scene or any clues that could be
used as criminal evidence to help in the investigation and
uncover the truth. This could have been carried out without
neglecting the humanitarian aspect of the tasks to be
implemented, i.e. giving priority to finding the victims and
the injured, providing the latter with the first aid in
order to save them. Serious mistakes were recorded in this
regard:
a) There was a state of chaos in the crime scene not only
during the first few hours following the explosion, during
which much focus is on extinguishing the fire, saving the
injured and looking for the missing, but regrettably and
unnecessarily for a much longer time.
b) There was no coordination between all the security organs
present on the crime scene.
c) Looking for the missing persons was done in an
irresponsible, unprofessional and careless way. Some were
later found by accident or by their families. The following
controversial elements were recorded:
- The body of Zahi Abu Rujaili, a Lebanese citizen, was
found on 15 March 2005. According to the medical examiner,
the victim had survived the explosion for approximately 12
hours.
- The body of one of the victims was found by coincidence 8
days after the explosion.
- The body of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayeeni, a Lebanese citizen,
was found 16 days after the explosion by his family and not
the judicial or civil defense officers.
- The fate of Farhan Ahmad Al-Issa is still unknown, he is
still missing. It is feared that finding his body would
constitute yet another scandal.
d) A few hours after the explosion took place, around 2300
hrs, major evidence was removed from the crime scene. The
convoy cars of the late former Prime Minister were
transferred to Helou Barracks under the pretext of
preserving them although what was left of the cars did not
justify their preservation except for their value as
criminal evidence because they were the target of the
explosion. This was not the only instance bearing proof of
the tampering with the crime scene. A BMW car that was not
part of the convoy was also removed whereas focus should
have been on not removing any cars and maintaining them the
way they rested after the explosion in order to determine
how the crime was committed.
e) A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on the
day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, in the evening for
no justifiable reason. As soon as the Minister of Interior
and Municipalities got knowledge of it, he gave orders to
retrieve it and preserve the crime scene as it was.
C. The conduct of the investigation, its conditions and the
determination of how the crime was committed:
a) It is common knowledge that major mistakes were made in
the course of conducting the investigation, among which the
leaking of information that created confusion. This in turn
compromised the trustworthiness of the local investigation.
(….)
III. Responsibilities
a) Responsibility for a tragic crime such as the one we are
dealing with cannot be limited to one aspect. As mentioned
above, it encompasses the political, judicial and security
aspects.
(….)
Decision to remove motorcade vehicles
65. The decision to fill the crater at the crime scene, to
remove the motorcade vehicles and to re-open the street on
the day after the blast, is confusing, assuming that there
was a collective will to perform a professional crime scene
examination in order to track down the perpetrators and
bring them to justice. The confusion, reflected in the
variety of statements from the officials most closely
involved, speaks for itself.
Investigative Judge Mezher
66. At 2230 hrs on 14 February, Judge Mezher was at his
home, when he got a phone call from General Naji Mulaeb, who
informed the Judge that the representatives from the various
agencies at the crime scene had started collecting pieces of
metal from the motorcade vehicles in order to perform their
own further forensic examinations. There was nothing General
Mulaeb could do to stop them. He suggested that the
motorcade vehicles be removed to a safe place and proposed
the Helou barracks in Beirut. Judge Mezher agreed to the
proposal under the following conditions. The vehicles should
be filmed on the spot, they should be marked and numbered:
they should also be filmed during the transportation and
again upon arrival at the Helou barracks, where they should
be covered and guarded around the clock in order to avoid
any tampering with evidence. Judge Mezher had no information
about a decision to fill the crater and reopen the street
(witness statement). The vehicles were moved from the crime
scene during the night of 14 February.
General Jamil Al-Sayyed
67. On the morning of 15 February 2005, General Al-Sayyed
read in the newspaper about the removal of the motorcade
vehicles. At 0800 hrs, he called General Ali Al-Hajj, the
Head of the ISF and asked what was going on. General Al-Hajj
replied that two teams were working on clearing the road
which would be reopened at 1000 hrs. In response to a direct
question, General Al-Hajj stated that the orders came from
Mustapha Hamdan, the Commander of the Presidential Guard
(witness statement).
General Ali Al-Hajj
68. On 14 February 2005 at 2230 hrs, Mr. Saddik received a
telephone call at his office, (where he was with General
Hisham Aouar) from the Director General of the Public Works
Ministry, Mr. Fadi Nammar. Mr. Nammar told him that a
decision had been taken to re-open the road the next day and
that his staff were ready to start working at sunrise the
next morning. The call was on the landline and was overheard
by General Aouar. He claimed to be surprised about the
telephone call because Mr. Nammar had no jurisdiction in the
matter. It was publicly recognized that Fadi Nammar was very
close to the Republican Palace, which meant that he was
taking his orders from there. Mr. Nammar alleged that he had
cleared the matter with the Investigative Judge. He called
the acting Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb, and
informed him about the call from Mr. Nammar and asked him to
check with Judge Mezher whether he was aware of this
decision. General Mulaeb called Judge Mezher, who was aware
of the decision to re-open the road and had no objection.
General Mulaeb then asked what should be done with the
vehicles. Judge Mezher replied that they should be brought
to a secure place and proposed the Helou Barracks (witness
statement).
69. The next morning, 15 February 2005, Mr. Nammar met with
the Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoub Sarraf, in order to
arrange for the re-opening of the Minae Al-Hosn Street.
Sarraf is very close to the Republican Palace and he was
also aware of the decision (witness statement).
General Hisham Aouar
70. With regard to the removal of the motorcade, General Aouar indicated that he did not know who gave the order. He
was asked to assist in the filming of the removal of the
motorcade on 14 February 2005 during the meeting with the
Investigative Judge, but nothing else was mentioned about
the removal of the motorcade vehicles from the crime scene.
On that same evening, between 2230 and 2300 hrs, he was at
the office of the ISF General Director, General Ali Al-Hajj,
and he told him that the cars were going to be removed. He
also told him that the ISF had to provide assistance by
marking the locations of the vehicles and their filming
(witness statement).
Director General Fadi Nammar
71. Mr. Nammar did not remember whether General Al-Hajj
telephoned him on 14 February 2005, but he remembered his
calling General Al-Hajj the next day, as he always did in
similar situations. At the time of the telephone call, he
was at the office of the Governor of Beirut. He told General
Al-Hajj that they were prepared, if needed, to offer help.
General Al-Hajj passed him on to a General working for ISF,
who told him that there was a survey going on at the crime
scene. The General stated he would come back to Mr. Nammar
in due course. Mr. Nammar did not recall the name of the
General, but he was with Al-Hajj. He had no authority to
decide to open roads in Beirut and he did not give any
orders to remove the motorcade vehicles. He also denied any
contacts to the Republican Palace(witness statement).
72. Subsequently, it was confirmed (by telephone lists) that
General Ali Al-Hajj made the telephone call from his
landline to Mr. Nammar's mobile phone on the evening of 14
February 2005. It was also confirmed that Mr. Nammar made
the telephone call to General Al-Hajj the following day
(witness statement).
The Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoob Sarraf
73. According to his statement he did not give any
instructions. The Army and the Police took over. He had
telephone contact with Mr. Fadi Nammar on 14 February 2005.
Acting Commander of Beirut Police,
General Naji Mulaeb
74. Between 2030 and 2200 hrs on 14 February 2005, General Mulaeb received a telephone call at his office from General
Ali Al-Hajj who ordered General Mulaeb to transfer the
convoy vehicles from the crime scene and secure them in a
safe place, on the understanding that within two days the
road would be re-opened. If experts wanted to come and
inspect the vehicles, they would be available. General
Mulaeb was surprised by this order and did not accept it. He
told General Al-Hajj that he had nothing to do with the
crime scene, since the site was under the authority of Judge
Mezher. General Al-Hajj told General Mulaeb to contact the
Judge, which he did. The Judge was also surprised and asked
the reason for the hurry. General Mulaeb told him that he
received his orders from General Al-Hajj and that he was
surprised as well. The Judge told him to give him some time
and that he would call back. After a while, between 10 and
30 minutes, the Judge called back and said that the cars
could be transferred (witness statement).
General Mustapha Hamdan
75. After the blast on 14 February 2005, General Hamdan took
all necessary measures to protect the President and the
Presidential areas. He did not recall any details, but he
did not go to the scene of the blast. He did not issue any
orders or directives regarding the activities at the crime
scene, since it did not fall within his responsibilities.
Thus, he had nothing to do with any orders to clean the
street, to fill the crater or to remove the motorcade
vehicles (witness statement).
Head of Internal Security Forces, General
Ashraf Rifi
76. In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General Rifi
stated that the person who gave the order to get a bulldozer
or bulldozers to the crime scene to fill the hole caused by
the explosion etc. was General Mustapha Hamdan, who at the
time of the incident was the Commander of President Lahoud's
security detail and therefore by Lebanese law had nothing to
do with issues related to crime scene investigation (witness
statement).
Lebanese Investigation: Ahmad Abu Adass
77. At approximately 1411 hrs on 14 February 2005, barely an
hour after the explosion, Leila Bassam of Reuters received
an anonymous telephone call from a man with an accent that
was not Lebanese but which she could not identify. According
to Ms. Bassam, as soon as she answered the call, the man
directed her to “[w]rite this down,” told her to be quiet,
and then read the following statement in classical Arabic:
“We, al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham, declare that we
have meted out due punishment to the infidel Rafik Hariri so
that he may be an example to others.”
The caller concluded with an Islamic religious saying and
then hung up.
78. Mr. Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the Beirut Bureau chief of
Al-Jazeera, recalls receiving four telephone calls that day
related to the same claim of responsibility. In the first
telephone call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as
speaking poor Arabic in an African, Afghan or Pakistani
accent, claimed that Al-Nasra wal Jihad was responsible for
Mr. Hariri's execution by a suicide bomb. Shortly
thereafter, Al-Jazeera informed the public about this claim
of responsibility. Al-Jazeera next received a call from
another anonymous person claiming to be from the same group,
this time a fluent Arabic speaker, who explained where Ben
Jeddou and his colleagues could locate a videocassette
containing further information about the assassination --
namely, in a tree near the ESCWA building in downtown Beirut
-- and directing them to fetch the tape within 15 minutes.
Mr. Ben Jeddou sent a colleague to locate the videocassette.
Eventually, a white envelope containing a type-written
detailed statement and a videocassette was found. After more
calls from the same group asking why the tape had not yet
been aired, Al-Jazeera aired the footage later that
afternoon.
79. The letter accompanying the tape, purporting to be from
the Nasra and Jihad Group of Greater Syria, states in part:
“Praise be to God for the banner of Nasra and Jihad is
victorious in Greater Syria, and with God's blessings the
agent of the infidels in Mecca and Medina, Rafik Hariri, has
been meted out his due punishment through a suicide
operation executed by the Mujahid Ahmad Abu Adass bearing
the banner of Nasra and Jihad in Greater Syria on Monday, 14
February 2005, the 5th of Muhurram 1426 according to the
Islamic Calendar, in Beirut. …. Attached is film recording
of the martyr Ahmad Abu Adass, executor of the operation.”
In the tape, an individual identifying himself as Mr. Abu
Adass, uses similar phraseology.
80. Soon after the airing of the tape, the Lebanese
authorities had acquired extensive information about Mr. Abu Adass's background and began questioning his family and
associates. Much of this information apparently came from
Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al, of Al-Ahbash, an Islamic group active
in the area of the Palestinian camps where Mr. Abu Adass had
reportedly lived. Sheikh Abdel-Al stated to UNIIIC that he
received a telephone call from the presidential palace
shortly after the airing of the Abu Adass video, enquiring
whether Abdel-Al had any information about Mr. Abu Adass.
According to Mr. Abdel-Al, he obtained information about Mr.
Abu Adass's background, including his address, the fact that
he often went to Ein al Helwa, that he was a Wahabi, that he
was well-educated, had probably studied computer science,
and that he visited Abu Obeida (deputy to the leader of Jund
al Sham). Sheikh Abdel-Al also obtained the names of Mr. Abu
Adass' family and friends: he sent this information by
facsimile to President Lahoud, Ali Hajj, Albert Karam, Jamea
Jamea, and Maher al Toufeily. Sheikhh Abdel-Al reportedly
also met with Syrian intelligence official, Jamea Jamea, on
the evening of 14 February 2005 and gave him the information
about Mr. Abu Adass, which Jamea Jamea subsequently relayed
to the ISF.
81. The ISF visited Abu Abass' house, accompanied by a
member of Al-Ahbash, and seized a computer, as well as a
number of compact disks which were primarily of a
fundamentalist Islamic nature. Although the report on the
search noted that most of the documents stored on the
computer were downloaded from the internet, there was no
indication that Mr. Abu Adass' home had internet access.
Many of Mr. Abu Adass' friends and relatives were
interviewed extensively by the authorities (including by the
ISF and military intelligence) in the days immediately
following the explosion. Mr. Abu Adass himself, however,
could not be located. On the day of the explosion 10 people
were questioned and over the course of next two months
approximately 40 people were interviewed. The Lebanese
investigation further revealed that Mr. Abu Adass had been
employed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004, which was
owned in part by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Sani, who was a member of
the Ahmed Miqati and Isma?l Al-Khatib network.
82. In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General Sayyed
to Judge Mezher, General Sayyed concluded that the videotape
was authentic and “Ahmad Abu Addas, who appears on the tape,
was . . . clearly a definite participant in the
assassination.” The only basis provided for this conclusion
was the statement that “[t]he way in which he delivers the
statement and shows himself without any covering over his
face is the manner adopted by suicide bombers in similar
cases. The fact that he did not conceal his face while
making the statement indicates that he must have been
personally responsible for setting off the explosion.”
(Information About Facts Relating to the Broadcast on
Al-Jazeera of a Videotape Claiming Responsibility, No.
606/A'A, 17 February 2005)
Australian Investigation
83. On 15 February 2005, a request was forwarded to the
Australian Federal Police from the Prosecutor General
requesting that six individuals be arrested as suspects for
participating in the Hariri assassination. The responsible
ISF official at Beirut International Airport, informed ISF
General Al-Hajj about these six individuals. General Al-Hajj
transmitted this information directly to Prosecutor General,
Judge Rabia Kaddoura, who contacted the Australian
authorities. The Australian investigation absolved these six
suspects of any involvement in this crime, a position with
which the Lebanese authorities in charge of the
investigation agreed.
84. The records indicate that the Lebanese authorities based
their suspicion on the following factors:
a) The six persons of interest departed from Beirut
International Airport one and a half hours after the bombing
occurred;
b) The six persons had no luggage; and
c) One of the six persons bore a resemblance to Mr. Abu
Adass, who was depicted in a video of an extremist group
that had claimed responsibility for the bombing.
85. The Australian authorities executed an extensive
investigation to assist the Lebanese authorities. The
investigation included raising airport alerts, interviews of
the six individuals and other members of the group,
explosive residual swabbing (including the individuals,
their airplane seating, and their luggage), and examining
the aircraft for possible explosives. Although it was
reported that the six persons identified as “suspects” were
without luggage, they in fact were carrying luggage. Three
of the six suspects subject to a forensic examination.
86. The findings of the Australian investigation revealed:
(1) The group was traveling to Jeddah as part of a religious
pilgrimage; (2) No common organic or inorganic explosive or
post-blast residue was detected in any of the samples taken;
and (3) No person interviewed by the Australian authorities
with respect to this investigation had any involvement nor
any knowledge about any involvement in the Hariri
assassination.
V. THE
COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION
Overview
87. UNIIIC was declared operational by the Secretary General
on 16 June 2005. From 16 June to 6 October 2005, 244 witness
statements, 293 investigator's notes and 22 suspect
statements have been issued. A number of searches have been
conducted and 453 crime scene exhibits have been seized. A
total of 16,711 pages of documents have been produced.
Thirty investigators from 17 different nations have been
involved in the UNIIIC investigative measures, as well as
external experts.
88. At the outset, the time factor affecting the Commission
has to be emphasized. UNIIIC was declared operational four
months after the actual crime, which means that the
perpetrators and their accomplices have had plenty of time
to destroy evidence and/or to collude with each other, the
ability to recall of potential witnesses has been
diminished, and previous omissions and inadvertent or
deliberate loss and destruction of evidence could not be
undone.
89. The first month after the Secretary-General declared UNIIIC operational was focused on updating the investigators
on the current status of the investigation, including an
assessment of measures undertaken by the Lebanese
authorities. Much time was spent on analysis of material
handed over to the Commission by the Prosecutor General,
followed by interviews for clarification with key witnesses,
based on written materials on the following topics:
- Reconstruction of actions and whereabouts of Mr. Hariri
prior to the blast.
- Findings and results from activities by the Lebanese
authorities undertaken at the crime scene and adjacent
areas.
- Tampering with evidence.
- Road works at the scene prior to the blast.
- The Abu Adass track
- The Mitsubishi Canter van
- Collection and analysis of telephone lists
- Collection and analysis of CCTV-material, videos and
photos collected from a diversity set of possessors
depicting the scene prior to and after the blast.
- Financial transactions.
90. These measures in turn led to new witnesses. A public
information “hot line” was installed on which anybody could
approach the Commission about the case: this measure
resulted in several new interviews and new clues that needed
to be followed up.
91. The compilation and organization of files and evidence
was time-consuming, involving maintaining and improving the
system for storing and recording evidence, which includes
thousands of pages of documents and written testimonies, as
well as numerous videos and photographs. Legal issues
highlighted the need for research into Lebanese criminal law
and procedure in order to ensure the proper protocols for
searches, arrests, suspect interviews, and charging
documents. The Lebanese authorities' assistance in these
matters was very praiseworthy.
92. The second month was characterized by a change in
investigative directions and priorities, in the sense that
investigators followed up new clues and tracked down new
witnesses based on their conclusions from previous measures
and professional analysis. Many different sources approached
the Commission and provided the investigation with useful
information. The vast majority of senior officials in the
involved Lebanese authorities were interviewed to clarify
the allotment of competencies, chains-of-command, and their
extent of involvement, as well as decisions taken (or which
were neglected). During this period of time the support base
of the Commission was reinforced and new software programmes
were installed, which made the data-base more operational.
93. During the third month, a full scale crime scene
examination was conducted by a joint Dutch / British /
Japanese expert team at the site itself and in adjacent
areas, including the sea floor adjacent to the scene of the
blast. The aim of this operation was to find physical
evidence at the crime scene, to reconstruct the improvised
explosive device (IED) used and to identify the Mitsubishi
Canter van. The operation was accomplished in situ during
September.
Planning of the Assassination
94. During all measures and efforts undertaken by the UNIIIC,
no new hard leads or traces regarding the motive and reason
for assassinating Mr. Hariri have emerged to supplement
those which can be attributed to events during the second
half of 2004 which culminated in Mr. Hariri's decision to
step down as the Prime Minister and the prognosis of the
outcome of the general elections in Lebanon. Strong
indicators on the latter matter are the massive Future Party
election campaign; the Lebanese authorities' reaction on the
olive oil affair, in February 2005, where the distributors
were arrested (by the Lebanese authorities while
distributing free olive at the behest of Mr. Hariri)
(investigator notes): and last but not least the factual
outcome of the elections. New witnesses have approached the
Commission who were reluctant to have any contacts with the
Lebanese authorities due to lack of confidence, stating that
the assassination of the former Prime Minister could not
have occurred without the knowledge of the Lebanese
authorities and the approval from Syria.
95. The structure and organization of the Syrian and
Lebanese intelligence services in Lebanon at the time of the
blast, including protocols for reporting, shows a pervasive
impact on everyday life in Lebanon. Good examples of this
are documents collected from the former Syrian Intelligence
post, Villa Jabr, at Bologna Forest, Lebanon and an
intercepted telephone conversation between General Ghazali
and a prominent Lebanese official on 19 July 2004, at 0945
hrs (excerpt):
“Ghazali:I know it is early but I thought we should keep up
you posted. The President of the Republic told me this
morning that they are two to rule the country the Prime
Minister and him. He said that things cannot continue this
way. The Prime Minister is always irritating him and we are
always shutting him up and yelling at him. He made it clear
he cannot continue this way.
(...)
X: Take it easy on me. Can you appoint a new Government at
this time?
Ghazali: Yes we can appoint one. What could be the problem?
We can name Botros Harb.
(…)
Ghazali: Let me tell you one thing. Let the worker's
movement take the street on the 20th in Solidere and
Koraytem.
X: Let's speak it over. Take it easily. I have to take into
consideration the best interests of Syrian and Lebanon.
Ghazali: We are keen on Syria's best interest but I am now
talking about Rafik Hariri.
X: So, the decision is taken.
Ghazali: I wish to tell you one thing. Whenever we need to
speak to Hariri we have to suck up to him and he does not
always answer.
X: To hell with him. What do I care about him?
Ghazali: What do I care about him? The President can't stand
him so why should I?
X: Fine, may he rot in hell …
(…)
Ghazali: No. Let him be the laughing stock and be pointed at
as the person who ruined and indebted the country. Let the
people take the street in Koraytem and Solidere; let the
manifestations continue until he is forced to resign like a
dog.
X: What about another option. I send him a message saying:
Resign God damn it.
Ghazali: No, don't send him a message or else he will say
they forced me to resign. Let the street … you know what I
mean. Or else he will use this as a bargaining card with his
American and French masters.
X: So shall we leave things to the street?
Ghazali: This is better.
X: Let's go for it.”
96. One witness of Syrian origin but resident in Lebanon,
who claims to have worked for the Syrian intelligence
services in Lebanon, has stated that approximately two weeks
after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559,
senior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri. He claimed that a senior Lebanese security
official went several times to Syria to plan the crime,
meeting once at the Meridian Hotel in Damascus and several
times at the Presidential Place and the office of a senior
Syrian security official. The last meeting was held in the
house of the same senior Syrian security official
approximately seven to 10 days before the assassination and
included another senior Lebanese security official. The
witness had close contact with high ranked Syrian officers
posted in Lebanon.
97. At the beginning of January 2005, one of the high ranked
officers told the witness that Rafik Hariri was a big
problem to Syria. Approximately a month later the officer
told the witness that there soon would be an “earthquake”
that would re-write the history of Lebanon.
98. The witness visited several Syrian military bases in
Lebanon. At one such base, in Hammana, he observed a white
Mitsubishi van, with a white tarpaulin over the flatbed. The
observations were made on 11, 12 and 13 February 2005. The
Mitsubishi left the Military base in Hammana on the morning
of 14 February 2005. The Mitsubishi Canter van, which was
used as the bomb carrier, entered Lebanon from Syria through
the Bekaa border and a military hot lane on 21 January 2005,
at 1320 hrs. It was driven by a Syrian Colonel from the Army
Tenth Division.
99. On 13 February 2005, the witness drove one of the Syrian
officers to the St. George area in Beirut on a
reconnaissance exercise, as he subsequently understood it to
have been after the assassination took place.
100. Regarding Mr. Abu Adass, the witness has stated that he
played no role in the crime except as a decoy. He was
detained in Syria and forced at gunpoint to record the video
tape. Subsequently, he was killed in Syria. The videotape
was sent to Beirut on the morning of 14 February 2005, and
handed over to Jamil Al Sayyed. A civilian with a criminal
record and an officer from the Sûreté Générale were tasked
with putting the tape somewhere in Hamra and then calling
Ghassan Ben Jeddo, an Al-Jazeera TV reporter.
101. General Jamil Al-Sayyed, according to the witness,
cooperated closely with General Mustapha Hamdan and General
Raymond Azar in the preparation of the assassination of Mr.
Hariri. He also coordinated with General Ghazali (and, among
others, people from Mr. Ahmad Jibreel in Lebanon). General
Hamdan and General Azar provided logistical support,
providing money, telephones, cars, walkie-talkies, pagers,
weapons, ID-cards etc. Those who knew of the crime in
advance were among others, Nasser Kandil and General Ali
Al-Hajj.
102. Fifteen minutes before the assassination, the witness
was in the vicinity of the St. George area. He received a
telephone call from one of the senior Syrian officers, who
asked the witness where he was. When he answered, he got the
advice to leave the area immediately.
103. Another witness approached the Commission and stated
that he had met with General Hamdan in the middle of October
2004. General Hamdan talked very negatively about Mr. Hariri
accusing him of being pro-Israeli. General Hamdan ended the
conversation by stating: “We are going to send him on a
trip, bye, bye Hariri”. After the assassination, the witness
was strongly reminded not to discuss this conversation with
anyone.
104. Another “witness” who later became a suspect, Zuhir Ibn
Mohamed Said Saddik, has given detailed information to the
Commission about the crime, in particular insofar as the
pla |