UN Report

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REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION COMMISSION ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1595 (2005)

Detlev Mehlis
Commissioner 19 October 2005
UNIIIC

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. The Security Council, by its resolution 1595 of 7 April 2005, decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of the terrorist attack which took place on 14 February 2005 in Beirut that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and others, including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.

2. The Secretary-General notified the Council that the Commission began its full operations with effect from 16 June 2005. The Commission was granted an extension to the initial period of investigation mandated by the Council, until 26 October 2005.

3. During the course of its investigation, the Commission received extensive support from the Government of Lebanon and benefited from expert inputs from a number of national and international entities.

4. The main lines of investigation of the Commission focused on the crime scene, technical aspects of the crime, analysis of telephone intercepts, the testimony of more than 500 witnesses and sources, as well as the institutional context in which the crime took place.

5. The full case file of the investigation was transmitted to the Lebanese authorities during October 2005.

6. The present report sets out the main lines of enquiry of the investigation conducted by the Commission, its observations thereon, and its conclusions, for the consideration of the Security Council. It also identifies those matters on which further investigation may be necessary.

7. It is the Commission’s view that the assassination of 14 February 2005 was carried out by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities. The crime had been prepared over the course of several months. For this purpose, the timing and location of Mr. Rafik Hariri’s movements had been monitored and the itineraries of his convoy recorded in detail.

8. Building on the findings of the Commission and Lebanese investigations to date and on the basis of the material and documentary evidence collected, and the leads pursued until now, there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this terrorist act. It is a well known fact that Syrian Military Intelligence had a pervasive presence in Lebanon at the least until the withdrawal of the Syrian forces pursuant to resolution 1559. The former senior security officials of Lebanon were their appointees. Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out without their knowledge.

9. It is the Commission’s conclusion that the continuing investigation should be carried forward by the appropriate Lebanese judicial and security authorities, who have proved during the investigation that with international assistance and support, they can move ahead and at times take the lead in an effective and professional manner. At the same time, the Lebanese authorities should look into all the case’s ramifications including bank transactions. The 14 February explosion needs to be assessed clearly against the sequence of explosions which preceded and followed it, since there could be links between some, if not all, of them.

10. The Commission is therefore of the view that a sustained effort on the part of the international community to establish an assistance and cooperation platform together with the Lebanese authorities in the field of security and justice is essential. This will considerably boost the trust of the Lebanese people in their security system, while building self-confidence in their capabilities.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, MID 2004

- 26 August 2004, Rafik Hariri meets in Damascus with Syrian President Bashar Assad to discuss the extension of the term of President Lahoud.
- 2 September 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1559 concerning the situation in the Middle East, calling for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.
- 3 September 2004, the Rafik Hariri bloc approves the extension law for President Lahoud.
- 3 September 2004, the Lebanese parliament adopts the extension law for President Lahoud and forwards it to the Lebanese government for execution.
- 7 September 2004, Economy Minister Marwan Hamadeh, Culture Minister Ghazi Aridi, Minister of Refugee Affairs Abdullah Farhat and Environment Minister Fares Boueiz, resigned from the cabinet in protest at the constitutional amendment.
- 9 September 2004, Prime Minister Rafik Hariri indicates to journalists that he will resign.
- 1 October 2004, Assassination attempt on Marwan Hamadeh, in Beirut, Lebanon.
- 4 October 2004, Rafik Hariri resigns as prime minister.
- 11 October 2004, Syrian President Bashar Assad delivers a speech condemning his critics within Lebanon and the United Nations.
- 19 October 2004, United Nations Security Council expresses concern that resolution 1559 has not been implemented.
- 20 October 2004, President Lahoud accepts Hariri's resignation and names Omar Karame to form the new government.

                                                        CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS, SEPTEMBER 2005

- 14 February 2005, Rafik Hariri and 22 other individuals are killed in a massive blast in a seafront area of central Beirut.
- 25 February 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission arrives in Lebanon.
- 8 March 2005, Hezbollah organizes a one million strong “pro-Syrian” march.
- 14 March 2005, a Christian/Sunni-led counter demonstration demands the withdrawal of Syrian troops and the arrest of the chief of the security and intelligence services.
- 19 March 2005, a bomb explodes in Jdeideh, a northern suburb of Beirut, wounding 11 people.
- 23 March 2005, three people are killed and three others wounded in an explosion in the Kaslik shopping centre, north of Beirut.
- 25 March 2005, the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission issues its report in New York.
- 26 March 2005, a suitcase bomb explodes in an industrial zone in northeast Beirut, injuring six.
- 1 April 2005, nine people are injured in an underground garage in an empty commercial and residential building in Broumana.
- 7 April 2005, the Security Council forms the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission into the assassination of Rafik Hariri and 22 others on 14 February 2005.
- 19 April 2005, Lebanon's Prime Minister Najib Mikati announces that parliamentary elections will be held on 30 May 2005.
- 22 April 2005, General Jamil Al-Sayyed, head of the Internal Security Forces and General Ali Al-Hajj, head of the Sûreté Générale, decide to put their functions at the disposal of Prime Minister Najib al Makati.
- 26 April 2005, the last Syrian troops leave Lebanon ending a 29 year military presence.
- 26 April 2005, the United Nations Verification Mission starts its mission to verify the complete withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence agents from Lebanon and its full compliance with the resolution 1559.
- 6 May 2005, a bomb explodes in Jounieh north of Beirut injuring 29 people.
- 7 May 2005, Parliament convenes to adopt the proposed changes to the electoral law of 2000.
- 30 May 2005, the first round of the elections was held. The Rafik Hariri Martyr List, a coalition of Saad Hariri's Future Movement, the Progressive Socialist Party and the Qornet Shehwan Gathering, won the majority of the seats in Parliament.
- 2 June 2005, journalist Samir Kassir is killed when his car explodes in east Beirut.
- 21 June 2005, former Lebanese Communist Party leader George Hawi is killed when his car explodes close to his home in Wata Musaytbeh.
- 30 June 2005, Fouad Siniora, former finance minister under Rafik Hariri, forms the new government composed of 23 ministers.
- 12 July 2005, Defence Minister Elias Murr is wounded and two other people are killed in a car bomb attack in Beirut.
- 22 July 2005, at least three people are wounded near rue Monot when a bomb explodes in the Ashrafieh quarter.
- 22 August 2005, three persons are injured in an explosion in a garage near the Promenade Hotel in the Al-Zalqa area north of Beirut.
- 16 September 2005, one person is killed and ten others wounded by a bomb near a bank in Ashrafieh.
- 19 September 2005, one person is killed and two wounded in a small explosion at the Kuwaiti information office in Beirut.
- 25 September 2005, a car bomb injures prominent news anchor, May Chidiac, in north Beirut.

I. PREFACE

1. The present report details progress made in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1595. In that resolution, adopted on 7 April 2005, the Security Council, condemning the 14 February 2005 terrorist attack in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and twenty two others, reiterating its call for the strict respect of Lebanon's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity, and noting the conclusions reached by an earlier fact-finding mission (S/2005/203), decided to establish an international independent investigation Commission (hereafter called UNIIIC or the Commission) to assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act, in order to, among other things, help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.

2. Prior to the adoption of resolution 1595, the Security Council had examined the report of the fact-finding mission to Lebanon on the same subject, submitted on 24 March 2005. The report reflected the outcome of a three-week enquiry, including a set of recommendations. The fact-finding mission was of the opinion that, since the credibility of the Lebanese authorities conducting the investigation was questioned, an international independent investigation should be set up to establish the truth. For this purpose, a team with executive authority needed to be created, covering all the fields of expertise needed for such an investigation. Notwithstanding the limited time and manpower the fact finding mission was granted, its conclusions and recommendations have been of considerable value to the Commission.

3. In a letter dated 29 March 2005 (S/2005/208), the Government of Lebanon expressed its approval of the Security Council's decision to establish an international commission of inquiry as well as its readiness to cooperate with the commission within the framework of Lebanese sovereignty and of its legal system.

4. Following the adoption of resolution 1595, intensive consultations took place regarding the establishment of UNIIIC, its staffing and its logistical support. On 26 May 2005, a small advance team headed by Commissioner Detlev Mehlis arrived in Beirut. Mindful of the urgency of the matter, from a temporary headquarters, the team endeavored to create the support platform for its future work.

5. On 13 June 2005, after extensive discussions with the Lebanese judicial authorities, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between the Government of Lebanon and the Commission. The MOU detailed the modalities of cooperation between the two parties. Of particular importance to the Commission was the agreement that “the Government of Lebanon shall guarantee that the Commission is free from interference in the conduct of its investigation, and is provided with all necessary assistance to fulfill its mandate.” The Commission was to determine its own procedures, collect evidence, both documentary and physical, meet and interview any civilians or/and officials it deemed necessary and have unrestricted access to all premises throughout the Lebanese territory, taking into account Lebanese law and judicial procedures. The Lebanese authorities, for their part, were to assist the Commission in its work by providing all documentary and material evidence in their possession and by locating witnesses as requested by the Commission.

6. On 16 June 2005, the Secretary-General declared the Commission operational. On 17 June 2005, a press conference was held by the Commissioner to solicit publicly the assistance of the Lebanese authorities and to invite the Lebanese people to help the Commission by relaying any information which might be of interest to the investigation. Two hotlines were set up for this purpose, operated by the Lebanese authorities.

7. Shortly after the signing of the MOU, the Lebanese authorities transmitted to the Commission an 8000 page case docket containing all the information and evidence collected since 14 February 2005. Henceforth, the Commission conducted a thorough criminal and judicial investigation in close cooperation with the relevant Lebanese judicial (State General Prosecutor of the Republic of Lebanon) and police (Internal Security Forces) authorities, in order to avoid duplication, overlapping or contradictory measures.

8. The Commission established close links with the Lebanese security and judicial authorities. Regular discussions were held, particularly with the judicial authorities, to exchange updated information and files, share results and plan for the emerging phases of the investigation. Most of the witnesses interviewed by the Commission were summoned through the Lebanese judicial and security authorities. A case in point was the 30 August 2005 operation, in which Lebanese security forces and UNIIIC investigators closely coordinated the house raid and search of former senior security officials, prior to their transfer under close escort to the Commission's Main Operating Base (MOB) for interviewing.

9. The Lebanese authorities were of great assistance in establishing the MOB, as well as a Forward Operating Base (FOB) for the work of the Commission. Lebanese security teams (police and military) worked hand in hand with the Commission's security team to ensure the safety and security of the staff and premises.

10. Although resolution 1595 gave the Commission executive authority, the Commission to a large extent was supported by the Lebanese judicial and security authorities during search and raid operations. Moreover, although the Commission was qualified to make proposals to the Lebanese authorities regarding the arrest of persons allegedly involved in the assassination, it remained the autonomous decision of the Lebanese authorities to proceed with such actions.

11. From a two-track investigation, one Lebanese, one United Nations, has emerged a complementary and unified investigation carried forward in tandem by the Commission and the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese authorities have steadily shown the capacity to take increasing responsibility in pursuing the case. This was demonstrated by the fact that they took the initiative of arresting suspects, organizing raids and searches.

12. Given a deep mistrust that has prevailed among the Lebanese people towards their security and judicial authorities, UNIIIC has become a source of great expectation and hope for change, as well as an “interface” between the Lebanese people and their authorities. The two press conferences, particularly the first one, in addition to the interview of the first suspect, and the arrest of the former senior security officials at the Commission's suggestion, had a catalytic effect. All of this was proof that in the eyes of the Commission, no one was above the law. This boosted Lebanese confidence. More witnesses came forward as the work of the Commission progressed. However, a number of people insisted that their identity not be disclosed to the Lebanese authorities.

13. There are other points worth highlighting. First, a number of witnesses were fearful that they would be harmed if it were known publicly that they were cooperating with the Commission. For this reason, the Commission took great care to ensure that witness interviews were conducted in a confidential manner. Because the Commission credits the concern that these individuals have for their safety, this report will not reveal the identity of those interviewed. Second, as is true in any investigation, witnesses often provide information beyond the scope of the investigation being conducted. The Commission has and will continue to forward to Lebanese authorities all information related to any criminal matter beyond the scope of the Commission's investigation. Finally, the Commission interviewed people whose agenda was to point the Commission not in the direction to where the evidence would lead it, but in the direction the particular individual(s) wanted the Commission to go. The Commission dealt with these individuals and situations by remaining focused on its single mission – to follow the evidence wherever it might lead and not to follow the agenda of any particular person or entity.

14. Lebanese public opinion reflects a widespread view that, once UNIIIC has delivered its report and closed down, Lebanon will be “left alone”. A prevailing fear is that, in the aftermath of the completion of UNIIIC's work, and sooner rather than later, the Syrian security and intelligence services will be back, orchestrating a “revenge campaign” in a society which remains “infiltrated” by pro-Syrian elements. Recent bombings, assassinations, and assassination attempts have been carried out with impunity; deliberate rumors and prophetic media analyses have sustained this state of mind and have deterred potential witnesses from contacting UNIIIC.

15. Notwithstanding fears and reluctance to volunteer information as the Commission's completion of its work seemed imminent (25 October), it is fair to say that the Lebanese people in general terms have been eager to come forward to help the Commission carry out its work.

16. The Commission could not operate in a media vacuum, particularly in Lebanon. It has been the Commission's steadfast policy not to be drawn directly into a dialogue in the Lebanese media, avoiding any escalation and staying above any challenging or provocative statements. Both press conferences were aimed at countering such speculation and clarifying the status of the investigation. Inevitably, their effect was short-lived.

17. To enhance transparency and broader cooperation, working with the judicial authorities entailed keeping the highest political authorities abreast of developments in the investigation, to the extent that such action did not call into question the independent nature of the Commission nor have a direct impact on the course of the investigation per se.

18. During the course of its investigation, the Commission had to face major logistical challenges. In this regard, the extensive support and assistance of sister organizations of the United Nations system and Interpol were invaluable in the daily work of the Commission.

19. The international community, for its part, was always prompt, when asked, in coming forward with expertise. This assistance greatly facilitated the work of the Commission and gave added value to its work. However, although resolution 1595 called on all States to provide the Commission with any relevant information pertaining to the Hariri case, it is to be regretted that no Member State relayed useable information to the Commission. A number of contacts led to mere exchanges of views and/or statements of facts. It is the Commission's reading of the resolution that the pertinent information envisaged by the Security Council would have included among other things, intelligence information that could have been submitted without any prior request from the Commission.

20. Despite the human, technical and financial capacities mobilized for the purpose of the investigation, and although considerable progress has been made and significant results achieved in the time allotted, the investigation of such a terrorist act with multi-faceted international dimensions and their ramifications normally needs months (if not years) to be completed so as to be able to establish firm ground for a potential trial of any accused individuals. It is of the utmost importance to continue to pursue the trail both within and outside Lebanon. The Commission's work is only part of a broader process. Even as this report is being written a significant arrest was made just a few days ago; witness interviews are continuing and complex evidence continues to be reviewed.

21. The Commission has established facts and identified suspects on the basis of evidence gathered or available to it. The Commission has checked and examined this evidence to the best of its knowledge. Until the investigation is completed, all new leads and evidence are fully analyzed, and an independent and impartial prosecution mechanism is set up, one cannot know the complete story of what happened, how it happened and who is responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the murder of 22 other innocent people. Therefore, the presumption of innocence stands.

22. In producing this report the Commission has endeavored to ensure that nothing it does or says undermines the ongoing criminal investigation and any trials that may follow. The Commission, at this juncture cannot disclose all the detailed elements and facts it has in its possession, beyond sharing them with the Lebanese authorities. The Commission has tried to set forth the facts and to present the analysis of those facts in a way that most accurately explains what happened, how it happened and who is responsible.

II. BACKGROUND

23. Syria has long had a powerful influence in Lebanon. During the Ottoman Empire, the area that became Lebanon was part of an overall administrative territory governed from Damascus. When the countries were established in the aftermath of the First World War, Lebanon was created from what many Arab nationalists considered to be rightfully part of Syria. Indeed, since the countries became independent, they have never had formal diplomatic relations.

24. Syrian troops were invited into Lebanon by Lebanese President Suleiman Franjieh in May 1976 in the early stages of the latter's civil war. In the Taif Agreement, reached among members of the Lebanese parliament, that ended the civil war in 1989, inter alia, Lebanon thanked Syria for its assistance in deploying its forces in the Lebanon. A provision of the agreement called for Lebanon and Syria to determine jointly the future redeployment of those forces. A later agreement reached between the two countries in May of 1991 regarding cooperation, restated that provision. Syrian forces withdrew in May 2005 in compliance with Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).

Relations between Mr. Hariri and Syria

25. The Commission's investigation has confirmed what many in Lebanon have long asserted, that senior Syrian intelligence officials had a powerful day-to-day and overall strategic influence on the governance of Lebanon. The apparent growing conflict between Mr. Hariri and senior Syrian officials, including Syrian President Bashar Assad, was a central aspect of the information provided to the Commission through interviews and documents. A meeting in Damascus between Mr. Hariri and President Assad on 26 August 2004 appeared to bring the conflict to a head. In that meeting, which allegedly lasted for 10-15 minutes, President Assad informed Mr. Hariri, who was then Prime Minister, that President Assad intended that Lebanon would extend the term in office of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, which Mr. Hariri opposed.

26. Lebanese and Syrian witnesses, and the transcript of a meeting between Mr. Hariri and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Walid Al-Moallem, provided the Commission with sharply differing versions of what was said in that meeting. A number of Lebanese witnesses – including then former ministers Marwan Hamadeh and Ghazi Areedi, Druze leader and head of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblat, parliament member Bassem Sabaa, and Mr. Hariri's son, Saad – reported that Mr. Hariri told them that President Assad brusquely informed him of the decision to extend President Lahoud's term and threatened to “break Lebanon over your [Mr. Hariri's] head and Walid Jumblat's” if Mr. Hariri (and presumably Mr. Jumblat) did not agree to support the extension of President Lahoud's term. Syrian officials characterized the meeting differently. Syrian Foreign Minister Farouk Sharaa and General Ghazali , head of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon, described the meeting in positive terms. General Ghazali told the Commission that Mr. Hariri told him that President Assad referred to Mr. Hariri as a “friend,” and described a cordial, respectful meeting in which President Assad consulted Mr. Hariri on the matter.

27. Following are excerpts of interviews conducted by the Commission regarding the 26 August 2005 meeting, relevant parts of a letter to the Commission from Mr. Sharaa, and a portion of the transcript of a taped conversation between Mr. Hariri and Mr. Al-Moallem:

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic, letter to the Commission of 17 August 2005:

“A meeting took place between President Bashar Assad and late Prime Minister Rafik Al-Hariri in Damascus on August 26th, 2004 within the framework of the ongoing political consultation between the Syrian and Lebanese leaders. (…) A general review was made of the local and regional developments, including the possible extension of the mandate of Emile Lahoud, the President of Lebanon, in view of the troubled regional conditions and based on the mutual interest in maintaining stability in Lebanon. Mr. Al-Hariri requested that in case a consensus regarding the mandate extension is reached in the Council of Ministers, Syria should make endeavors to get President Lahoud to better
cooperate in the forthcoming period. The President requested Mr. Hariri to consult with his group and with whom he deems suitable and to take the appropriate position.”

Rustum Ghazali, undated written statement, submitted to the Commission by letter of 17 August 2005:

“I had two meetings at Anjar on that date (26 August 2004) with Prime Minister Hariri. The first was in the morning of August 26th, 2004, on his way to Damascus to meet President Bashar Assad in Damascus, and the second was on his return trip from Damascus to Beirut after meeting with President Bashar Assad in Damascus. The latter meeting was also held in our office at Anjar.”
(…)
“We discussed his meeting with President Bashar Assad. He (Hariri) looked relaxed. Prime Minister Hariri said that his meeting with President Bashar Assad was cordial and brief. According to Prime Minister Hariri, President Assad told him: Abu Bahaa, we in Syria have always been dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Today, I am also dealing with you as a friend and as the Prime Minister of Lebanon. Under the difficult circumstances currently witnessed by this region, with Lebanon in the midst, we are of the view that it is in the interest of Lebanon to maintain the continuity of the regime by extending the term of office of President Lahoud. As a friend, we would like you to clarify your position regarding this matter. We are in no hurry to know the answer, and you may wish to think about it at your convenience.”

Marwan Hamadeh, witness statement of 27 June 2005:

“On Wednesday 24 or 25 August, Mr. Hariri, Mr. Jumblat and Mr. Berri were all invited to go to Damascus in order to be informed about the decision to extend Mr. Lahoud's mandate. Mr. Jumblat informed R. Ghazali that he would need to discuss it with President Assad. R. Ghazali insisted that the answer should be “yes” before setting up any appointment. He actually advised Mr. Jumblat to respond positively because this was a strategic matter for President Assad. Mr. Jumblat's answer was negative. One hour later, Mr. Jumblat called me and told me that the Syrian Intelligence had cancelled his appointment.

In the evening, Mr. Jumblat and myself went to visit Mr. Hariri. He said that R. Ghazali insisted that as long as his answer was not positive, he would not confirm his appointment either. He was asked to go to Damascus, stay in his house (…) until further notice. The following day, he was called in for a short meeting.”
(…)
“The day Mr. Hariri met with President Assad, I was meeting at Mr. Jumblat's residence in Beirut, with Bassem Sabaa and Ghazi Areedi. We saw that Mr. Hariri's motorcade was back by 1 PM which meant that the meeting in Damascus was pretty short. We saw Mr. Hariri who looked tired. He was sweating. He told the four of us that President Lahoud was to be reelected or “he will have to pay a high price”. (…)He reported President Assad saying to him: I will break Lebanon on your head and Jumblat's head.”

Ghazi Areedi, witness statement of 1 July 2005:

“Mr. Hariri reported to us that President Assad told him: “If Jacques Chirac puts me out of Lebanon, I will consider different options and will let you know. Either you are with us or against us. My choice is Emile Lahoud for President. I will make sure he is the President. I will wait for your answer. (…) Tell Walid Jumblat that if he has Druze people in Lebanon, I also have a Druze community in Syria. I am ready to do anything.”

Walid Joumblatt, witness statement of 28 June 2005:

“According to Mr. Hariri, Assad told him:”Lahoud is me. I want to renew his mandate. (…) If Chirac wants me out of Lebanon, I will break Lebanon. (…) During his visit to my house, Mr. Hariri was extremely tense and disappointed. He was in a very bad position.”

Jubran Tueni, witness statement of 25 June 2005:

“Later on, in 2004, when the issue of President Lahoud's extension came up, Mr. Hariri also told me, that President Assad had threatened him directly and told him, that voting against the extension would be considered as being directed against Syria. According to Mr. Hariri, President Assad added that in that case they, the Syrians, would “blow him up” and any of his family members and that they would find them anywhere in the world.”

Bassem Sabaa, witness statement of 30 June 2005:

“When Mr. Hariri came back from his meeting with President Assad, I met him at Walid Jumblat's house.”
(…)
“He reported to us President Assad's words who has put it bluntly: “I am personally interested in this matter. It is not about Emile Lahoud but about Bashar Assad”.

We asked him if he had had a chance to discuss the matter with President Assad. He said that President Assad told him that the matter was not open for discussion, that it was bound to happen or else I will break Lebanon”(…). He was extremely aggravated. He told me that for the sake of Lebanon and its interests, he must think about what he will do, that we are dealing with a group of lunatics who could do anything.”

Saad Hariri, witness statement of 9 July 2005:

“I discussed with my father, the late Rafik Hariri, the extension of President Lahoud's term. He told me that President Bashar Assad threatened him telling him: “This is what I want. If you think that President Chirac and you are going to run Lebanon, you are mistaken. It is not going to happen. President Lahoud is me. Whatever I tell him, he follows suit. This extension is to happen or else I will break Lebanon over your head and Walid Jumblat's. (…) So, you either do as you are told or we will get you and your family wherever you are.”

Rafik Hariri, taped conversation with Walid Al-Moallem on 1 February 2005:

“In connection with the extension episode, he (President Assad) sent for me and met me for 10 to 15 minutes.”
(…)
“He sent for me and told me: “ You always say that you are with Syria. Now the time has come for you to prove whether you meant what you said or otherwise.” (…) He did not ask my opinion. He said: “I have decided.” He did not address me as Prime Minister or as Rafik or anything of that kind. He just said: “I have decided.” I was totally flustered, at a loss. That was the worst day of my life.”
(…)
“He did not tell me that he wished to extend Lahoud's mandate. All he said was “I have decided to do this, don't answer me, think and come back to me.””
(…)
“I was not treated as a friend or an acquaintance. No. I was asked: “Are you with us or against us?” That was it. When I finished my meeting with him, I swear to you, my body guard looked at me and asked why I was pale-faced”

28. In the meeting with Mr. Al-Moallem, Mr. Hariri complained that he believed that President Assad was being deliberately misinformed by the Syrian security services and Mr. Sharaa about the actions of Mr. Hariri. Translated excerpts of the meeting include the following statements by Mr. Hariri:

? “I cannot live under a security regime that is specialized in interfering with Hariri and spreading disinformation about Rafik Hariri and writing reports to Bashar Assad.”
? “But Lebanon will never be ruled from Syria. This will no longer happen.”

29. During this discussion, Mr. Al-Moallem told Mr. Hariri that “we and the [security] services here have put you into a corner.” He continued, “Please do not take things lightly.”

30. The recorded interview clearly contradicts Mr. Al-Moallem's witness interview of 20 September 2005 in which he falsely described the 1 February meeting as “friendly and constructive” and avoided giving direct answers to the questions put to him.

Syrian cooperation with the Commission

31. The information set forth above, and the evidence collected by the Commission as described in the section below entitled Planning of the Assassination, point to the possibility that Syrian officials were involved in the assassination of Mr. Hariri. When the Commission attempted to get the cooperation of the Syrian Government in pursuing these lines of the investigation, the Commission was met with cooperation in form, not substance.

32. The initial contact between the Commission and the Syrian authorities took place on 11 June 2005 when the Commissioner sent a letter to the Syrian Foreign Minister, requesting a meeting with representatives of the Syrian government. Mr. Sharaa replied on 11 July, pledging the Syrian Government's support for the investigation in general terms. On 19 July, the Commission asked to interview several witnesses including the President of the Syrian Arab Republic. On 26 August, at the request of the Syrian government, a meeting took place between the Commissioner and a representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry, in Geneva, Switzerland. At that meeting, the Commissioner was given a letter containing written statements of four witnesses. It was indicated that President Assad would not be available for any interview. The Commissioner repeated his request for direct witness interviews and was told that the request was under consideration but that President Assad would not be available to be interviewed.

33. On 30 August the Commission sent another request to the Syrian Foreign Minister, requesting interviews of several additional witnesses and suspects in Syria. The letter requested the support of the Syrian government to search the premises of the suspects. On 7 September Foreign Minister Sharaa informed the Commission in writing that while the Commission's evidence was based on false testimony, his Government agreed that the persons listed in the Commission's requests of 19 July and 30 August, except for President Assad, could be interviewed.

34. On 12 September details of the upcoming interviews were discussed between the Commission and a representative of the Syrian Foreign Ministry. The Commission expressed its wish that the interviews should be held in a third country, neither Lebanon nor Syria, which was refused. The Syrian authorities insisted that the interviews take place in Syria with the participation of Syrian officials. The interviews took place between 20 and 23 September. Each interview was conducted in the presence of the Legal Advisor to the Syrian Foreign Affairs Ministry or another representative of the Foreign Ministry, one interpreter, two note takers, and at times, an additional person whose affiliation was not identified. At the end of the interview process, it was apparent that the interviewees had given uniform answers to questions. Many of those answers were contradicted by the weight of evidence collected by the UNIIIC from a variety of other sources. The Commission has not had the opportunity to follow up on these interviews or pursue its investigation regarding a possible Syrian involvement in the crime.

35. The Commission has concluded that the Government of Syria's lack of substantive cooperation with the Commission has impeded the investigation and made it difficult to follow leads established by the evidence collected from a variety of sources. If the investigation is to be completed, it is essential that the Government of Syria fully cooperate with the investigating authorities, including by allowing for interviews to be held outside Syria and for interviewees not to be accompanied by Syrian officials.

III. THE CRIME

36. On 14 February 2005 at approximately 1250 hrs, the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri left the Nejmeh Square in Beirut going back to the Kuraytem Palace. He traveled in a motorcade comprising of 6 cars, together with his security detail and Member of Parliament, Bassel Fleyhan.

37. When the motorcade passed the St. George Hotel at Minae Al-Hosn Street a huge explosion occurred and resulted in the death of Mr. Hariri and others.

38. Shortly after the blast, the Director of Al-Jazeera TV in Beirut received a telephone call from a man who stated that the Nasra and Jihad Group in Greater Syria claimed responsibility for the assassination of Mr. Hariri. This message was broadcast shortly thereafter.

IV. THE LEBANESE INVESTIGATION

Initial Measures

39. To resolve a crime of this magnitude requires strong management capacity, clear roles, coordination and access to sufficient competency, manpower, equipment and means of assistance. The following brief outline reviews measures undertaken by the Lebanese authorities in the period from the execution of the crime until UNIIIC was established.

Investigative Judge

40. Primary Military Investigative Judge Rasheed Mezher was responsible for the crime investigation during the period from 14 to 21 February 2005. On the latter date, a decision was taken by the Lebanese Government that the crime was a terrorist act targeting the Republic, which led to the case being transferred to a new competent court of jurisdiction, the highest Criminal Court in Lebanon, the Justice Council. A consequence of this decision was that a new investigative judge was appointed to lead the investigation, Judge Michel Abou Arraj, the representative of the Prosecutor General’s Office.

41. Judge Mezher arrived at the crime scene less than an hour after the blast, accompanied by Judge Jean Fahd from the Prosecutor General’s Office. He has described the situation at the crime scene as a chaos. His first decisions were to appoint the Assistant Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb, as the person in charge of the scene and to assign him the task of removing all dead bodies and wounded people from the scene, extinguish fires and, thereafter, to withdraw all people from the scene and close it off (witness statement).

42. At 1700 hrs, Judge Mezher summoned a meeting with all the involved bodies, both from the Internal Security Forces and the Military, comprising in total 10 officers. During the meeting Judge Mezher distributed tasks for the different bodies and gave further directions for the course of the investigation (witness statement).

43. The representatives from the Internal Security Forces during the meeting were: General Aouar as the acting Commander of the Judicial Police and Head of the Forensic Unit, General Mulaeb as acting Commander of the Beirut Police Force, General Salah Eid as the responsible person for the blast site and Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman in the capacity of the Head of the Information Division (witness statement).

44. After the meeting, at approximately 1900 hrs, Judge Mezher returned to the crime scene for a second time. He was not satisfied with his observations at the crime scene, but hoped it should be better the next day since responsibilities had been distributed at the earlier meeting. The shortcomings consisted mainly of lack of equipment, means of assistance and experience. In addition, there was a lack of communication between the various bodies involved, the directions from the Investigative Judge were not followed and he did not receive proper feed-back concerning the progress in the investigation (witness statement).

45. During the period of his functions as Investigative Judge, Judge Mezher summoned approximately 10 people to his office for interrogations, comprising staff from the St. George Hotel, Mr. Hariri’s close protection officers, the father and mother of Mr. Abu Adass and some eyewitnesses. He also, in consultation with Judge Jean Fahd, took the decision to request assistance from Switzerland regarding a forensic expert team to assist the Lebanese authorities in the investigation. When Judge Mezher left the function of Investigative Judge, 21 February 2005, no sustainable results had been achieved in the investigation.

46. The file was handed over to the new Investigative Judge, Judge Abou Arraj. Judge Abou Arraj was Investigative Judge for the investigation from 22 February to 23 March 2005. He was appointed by First Judge Tanios Khoury, at the Supreme Council, and the file was registered at Abou Arraj’s office on 22 February 2005 (witness statement). His first opinions when reviewing the file, were that the crime had been a terrorist attack that would require a long period of time and extensive investigative measures to be undertaken, in addition to the application of substantial resources. In his opinion, all the initial investigative measures had been performed in a professional and accurate way. He was surprised at the removal of the motorcade cars. He did not meet with Judge Mezher, but telephoned him whenever clarifications were needed (witness statement).

47. During the period of Judge Abou Arraj’s tenure as the Investigative Judge, the following measures were undertaken (compiled notes case file).

Date
Measures Affected persons
22 February • Recording of the lawsuit
24 February • Second Beirut Regional Detachment Record
• Inspection of St George’s
• A summary of all military writs
• Signing writs: Sûreté Générale , Internal Security Forces, State Security, Intelligence

25 February • The writ of the of the Special Criminal Investigation Section
• Investigations about the diggings in St George’s area
• The writ of the Special Criminal Investigation Section: Notifications.

• Tayssir Abu Adass and First Adjutant Maher Daouk

26 February • Several reports were received among them: The inspection report and the report about moving the cars to Helou Barracks + interrogating the guards

28 February • Interrogation
• Statements of witnesses • Tayssir Abu Adass
• Maher Daouk, Hassan Mohamed Ajuz and Amer Khaled Shehadeh

28 February • Subpoenaing

• Forensic Evidence Department: Asking for the assistance of foreign experts.
• Rashid Hammud (at the hospital), Mohamed Queiny (former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri’s bodyguards) and Tamer Lahib.

1 March • Giving the Head of the Fact finding mission to Lebanon FitzGerald the permission to look into the investigations.

2 March • Interrogations of two witnesses • Tamer Lahib and Mohamed Queiny.

3 March • The reports of Mitsubishi Company were received + the catalogue of the Mitsubishi pick-ups + a list of the names of the parts and pieces found at the explosion site + a map showing (unclear).
• Doctor Kawas report regarding the examination of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.
• A report was received from the Army Intelligence about interrogations.

• The report of Doctor Hussein Chahrour regarding the examination of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.

• Hussam Ali Mohsen, Ahmad Ammoura and Nabil Ghsoub (unclear) regarding there relations with suspect Ahmad Abu Adass (Note: they were not arrested).

5 March • Subpoenaing witnesses (the first three were to be interrogated the 8th of March 2005. The others on the 9th of March 2005.
• Engineer Makram Aouar, Hamad Mulaeb, Hussam Ali Mohsen, Mahmoud Baydoun (officer in the Sûreté Générale ), Afifi Abdallah Al-Hershi (unclear), Ghassan Ben Jeddou (Al-Jazeera Channel).

7 March • Inspection of the contents of the cardboard boxes (Dalal Dargham)
• Brigadier General Imad Kakour came and informed us about the investigations and took a copy of the investigation report, Ziad Ramadan was with him.

8 March • We received: The DNA results and the maps of the crime scene.

10 March • The report of Al-Bourj Squad regarding the search for Abdel Hameed Ghalayini cadaver.

11 March • The discussion of Lieutenant General Ziad Nasr + Captain Mitri Namar.
• Convocation of Hussam Mohsen
• Convocation of the Palestinian Marwan Abdel-Wahhab Kattan (unclear), 14/3/2005

14 March • Urging the heads of the services not to remove rubbles.
• Statements of witnesses.

• Letter of the international Mission regarding the completion of its work.

• Jack Chalitta, Ali Amhaz and Marwan Koubtan.

48. On 23 March 2005, Judge Abou Arraj stepped down from the post of Investigative Judge. The reason for this was the tense political atmosphere at this particular time: a lot of mistrust was being directed towards the Lebanese judiciary and criticism being leveled at the manner of the investigation. In addition, while in charge of the Hariri investigation, he also had to discharge his normal functions. The case was contaminated with political issues and during demonstrations in Beirut on 14 March 2005, he heard people mentioning his name in a critical manner (witness statement).

49. At the time he left the post of Investigative Judge, the only achievement in the investigation was the Mr. Abu Adass lead, despite attempts to focus on the modus operandi of the explosion and to get all experts involved to come up with one consensus opinion (witness statement).

50. Judge Abou Arraj was replaced by Investigative Judge Elias Eid, who as of October 2005, is still in charge of the investigation.

Internal Security Forces

51. On 14 February 2005, General Ali Al-Hajj was the Head of the Internal Security Forces (ISF). He was promoted to the post in November 2004, allegedly appointed by the Syrians, he stepped down from the post during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he was at his office when he was alerted about the blast. He immediately went to the crime scene by car. During the ride he called General Shahid Al-Khoury, Chief of the Services and Operations Division within ISF, who told him that it was a huge blast. General Al-Hajj then ordered Mr. Khoury to send all responsible units to the scene. The units comprised the Forensic Unit under the command of General Hisham Aouar, the Explosives Unit under the command of General Abdel-Badie Al-Soussi and the Investigation Unit under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Fouad Othman. This was his only responsibility, to provide sufficient resources. After the arrival of the Investigative Judge, all ISF staff was under the command of the Judge and General Ali Al-Hajj could not interfere in the investigation (witness statement).

52. In his opinion, the problems at the scene were related to the presence of too many different agencies, such as the Army, ISF, State Security and Public Security.

53. Later that afternoon, General Al-Hajj joined a meeting with the Higher Defence Council at the Presidential Palace. The meeting was chaired by the President. Other participants were the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Defence, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Economy, the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Public works, the Governor of Beirut and Commanders from the various security agencies. The meeting discussed the subject matter of the crime, its referral to the Judicial Council, and the ramifications of the crime.

54. After the meeting General Al-Hajj returned to his office: soon thereafter the Al-Jazeera TV channel broadcast a videotape, where Ahmad Abu Adass claimed responsibility for the blast and the killing of Mr. Hariri. From that time all available ISF resources, except those occupied with the crime scene work, were focused on the Abu Adass track.

Military Intelligence

55. On 14 February 2005, General Raymond Azar was the Head of Military Intelligence. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he was alerted about the blast by Colonel Mohamed Fehmi, Head of the Military Security Branch. He did not go to the crime scene, but followed the case in detail from his office, together with Colonel Albert Karam, the Chief of Beirut Intelligence Branch. He informed President Lahoud and General Ghazali about the blast at the time of its occurrence (witness statement).

56. Personnel from Military Intelligence (mainly specialists in the field of explosives) visited the crime scene and conducted their part of the examination. They confirmed that the type of explosives used were TNT and the estimated amount to be some 300 kilograms. All concrete evidence found on the site was handed over later to the ISF (General Hisham Aouar) and to General Azar’s knowledge there were some metal fragments and a gun. His opinion was that basically ISF, but also the Prosecutor General’s Office and the Investigative Judge, had the overall responsibility for the crime investigation.

57. In the afternoon of 14 February 2005, General Azar attended the meeting at the Higher Defence Council. At the meeting, a presentation was made about the assassination of Mr. Hariri, with all the details that were available at that time. Each participant presented his own point of view.

58. At a later stage, his Directorate was assigned to focus on three elements:

- The videotape of Ahmad Abu Adass
- The cellular communications that took place in the area of the explosion
- The type and amount of explosives used.

Sûreté Générale

59. On 14 February 2005, Brigadier General Jamil Al-Sayyed was the Head of the Sûreté Générale. He was promoted to the post in December 1998 and stepped down during spring 2005 in the aftermath of the blast that killed Mr. Hariri. According to his statement, he was at his office when he heard the blast, but thought that the noise was a result of Israeli air fighters passing through the sound barrier. Somewhere between 1315 and 1330 hrs, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmed Al-Assir informed him of the blast and that Mr. Hariri’s motorcade had been the target. He stayed at his office and no one from the Sûreté Générale was sent to the scene. He called the President, the Minister of the Interior and General Ghazali.

60. Later that afternoon, General Al-Sayyed attended the meeting at the Higher Defence Council. The meeting was focused on the consequences in the near future on the ground. The suggestions were submitted to the Government, which had a meeting later the same evening.

61. On Tuesday morning, 15 February 2005, he got a phone call from a journalist from Al-Jazeera who told him nobody had yet picked-up the Abu Adass videotape. The tape was brought to him 16 February 2005. He made a copy and sent the original to the Investigative Judge Abou Arraj.

Crime Scene Investigation

ISF Report

62. As with any similar criminal case, prompt examination of the crime scene and its surroundings is of paramount importance for the outcome of the investigation. The officer in charge of the crime scene, General Naji Mulaeb of the ISF, arrived at the scene at 1305 hrs on 14 February 2005. He has issued a report dated 3 March 2005, on the crime scene examination conducted by the Lebanese authorities (General Directorate of Internal Security Forces, Beirut Police Unit, Ref. No.: 95) stating the following:

“On implementation of investigation order issued by the first investigating judge of the military court in Beirut regarding the investigations and anything that can throw light on the enquiry into the explosion which caused the death of former Prime Minister Hariri and others.

Record: Investigation order issued by the first investigating judge of the military court in Beirut No23/2005 dated 14 February 2005.

Order from the General Department of Referrals No 207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.

On 14 February 2005 at about 1250 hours, an explosion took place in Beirut which the operations room reported as being close to the St. George Hotel. All patrols were ordered to go to the scene. I proceeded there and arrived within a few minutes. Cars on both sides of the road in the vicinity were ablaze and there was a lot of smoke. Civil defense, fire brigade and Red Cross vehicles hastened to the area and took action to put out the fire, gather the corpses and take the wounded to hospital. The scene was chaotic, and security and military personnel were mixed with civilians, firemen and first aid personnel and civilians, newspaper journalists and the media were all eager to get to the scene. I ordered all the officers and police officers and patrols to do everything necessary to maintain security corridors and to take the requisite measures to safeguard the scene of the crime and keep away onlookers and made the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat responsible for implementation.

The preliminary indications are that the explosion took place in the motorcade of Prime Minister Hariri but the outcome is not yet know.

Specialists in gathering evidence and explosives experts began their work.

In addition to political and security officers, there came to the scene a Government commissioner from the Military Court with some support staff; and Rasheed Mezher, the first investigating judge from the Military Court in Beirut, who orally delegated me, in my capacity as officer in charge of the police during the absence from 12 February 2005 of the Police Commander on a mission abroad, or whoever I should see fit, to undertake the investigations and anything that could throw light on that explosion and to duly inform him. The oral authorization would be followed up in writing.

As soon as the General Director of Internal Security arrived at the scene, I informed him of all the above.

In accordance with the above-mentioned oral delegation of authority, I ordered Major Salah Eid to undertake the necessary investigative procedures in his capacity as the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, within the remit of which the explosion took place, and to keep me informed.

The work of retrieving the corpses and taking the wounded to hospital continued, as did the work of personnel from the Central Office of Accidents and the explosive experts. A complete sweep was made of the scene and the surroundings. A team of engineers from the Lebanese Army came and took samples from the scene in order to carry out tests thereupon. An army detachment carried out a search of the site and buildings and assisted in imposing a security cordon.

In view of the urgency of the investigation, we sent telegram No. 2065 dated 14 February 2005 to the leadership of the regional police unit and to police unit commanders in which we asked that all the necessary investigations should be carried out within the remit of each unit with respect to the corpses that had been taken to the hospitals in each area, in order to permit their relatives to identify them and duly inform me, thereby enabling me to gain the approval of the relevant authorities for the return to their relatives of those corpses. Depositions were to be taken from the wounded and a copy deposited in the file of the overall investigation, through the Al- Burj squad.

Further to our telegram No. 2077 dated 14 February 2005, sent to unit departments regarding the isolation of the scene of the crime and establishment of a security cordon around it, we ordered the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat to use whatever personnel were necessary to perform those tasks and to place metal barricades and yellow tape around the scene and, in coordination with the commander of the traffic secretariat, to ensure the flow of traffic.

Major Eid kept me informed of the progress of the investigation and its outcome, and I duly informed the first investigating judge from the Military Court. The corpses were handed over to their relatives in accordance with legal principles.

On the instructions of the first investigating judge of the Military Court, and with the approval of the General Director of Internal Security Forces, the cars from the Hariri motorcade were taken to the Helou barracks, once they had been photographed in situ and a video recording had been made in the presence of the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat, the commander of the second Beirut traffic squad, the commander of the Al-Burj detachment and a squad of criminal investigators, and using the lights provided by the civil defense, in accordance with report No. 144/302 dated 14 February 2005. They were deposited in the Helou barracks.

In our telegram No. 2122 dated 15 February addressed to the commander of the emergency services, we requested that they should be safeguarded and that no-one should be allowed to touch them.

At 1500 hours on 15 February 2005, Major Omar Makkawi, the commander of the Beirut police unit, reported and assumed his command. He informed me of all the procedures that had been taken and all incidents that had occurred, and we followed up the process of the investigation being undertaken by Major Salah Eid. We then duly informed the first investigating judge of the Military Court of the same.

Pursuant to warrant No. 2F206/dated 17 February 2005, the unit commander transferred to us the written delegation of authority issued by the first investigating judge of the Military Court Ref 23/2005 dated 14 February 2005 concerning the explosion, which was transmitted to us for implementation by the General Directorate as No. 2SH207/1181 dated 15 February 2005.

Similarly, the unit command gave us, pursuant to warrant No. 206/1735 dated 18 February 2005, written authorization from that party Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order to keep the cars from the Hariri motorcade inside the barracks, cover them with tents and place them under guard, which was done.

In accordance with warrant No. 2F206/1736 dated 18 February 2005, The first investigating judge of the Military Court have us written authorization Ref. 36/2005 dated 18 February 2005, which included an order to contact the Governor of Beirut, who should supply us with the names of those recently working at a workshop at the site of the explosion. The aforementioned authority was carried out by means of a document of 14 pages which is attached.

Pursuant to the first delegation of authority referred to above; on the basis of the order to the commander of the second Beirut regional secretariat to carry out the investigation; and as a result of the first report, No. 302/143 dated 14 February 2005 and all the investigations arranged by the units in the police unit and the regional police unit, we hereby submit the following:

Table No. 1 has been prepared concerning the corpses that have been returned to their relatives.
Table No. 2 has been prepared concerning the persons injured by this explosion.
Table No. 3 contains the depositions that were made concerning the explosion.
A table has been prepared showing the measures that were taken: an examination of the scene of the crime; articles impounded; damaged cars; the loss of one person at the site of the explosion and the failure to find him.

All those procedures have been verified in report No. 302/1 dated 14 February 2005”.

Swiss Forensic Report

63. The Lebanese experts involved in the crime scene examination, representing a variety of different agencies, came up with different opinions on the findings and results of the examination. As a result, they were summoned to a meeting at the Military Court in the presence of the Prosecutor General (witness statement). The meeting led to a request from the Lebanese authorities for foreign assistance in examining the crime scene, which was directed to the Government of Switzerland. A Swiss forensic expert team visited Lebanon in March 2005 and conducted a forensic investigation. The team's final report stated (excerpt):

“Our conclusions about an explosion above or under ground are based upon the following examinations:

- Interpretations based on dispersion of fragments, size and shape of fragments
- Interpretations based on size and shape of crater
- Ballistic interpretations
- Interpretations of damages on buildings (structure, glass)

After interpretation and analysis of the dispersion of fragments, we can't give clear evidence whether there was an explosion above or under ground. Our analysis and research concerning the shape and form of the crater also gives no clear evidence whether there was an explosion above or under ground.

On the other hand, the form and shape of the crater gives some information about the possible amount of the charge (above or under ground):

- As mentioned in our report it is expected that an amount of about 1000 kg above ground will create a crater like the one on the scene
(…)
Concerning the fact that the charge was possibly placed in a car, it must have been of larger size. If such a vehicle has been used we expect some big fragments (e.g. from the frame) of the vehicle close to the center of the explosion.

The grade of damage of the metal fragments which were shown to us by the police (said to be originated of a Mitsubishi Canter) is consistent with fragments we would expect if such a vehicle was located in the center of the explosion.
(…)
After having conducted all the analysis and discussions of the facts we have collected, we came to the conclusion that it was most likely an explosion above ground.

According to this finding we estimate an amount of 1000kg of high explosive.

The unconfirmed and preliminary results of the analysis of a soil sample of the crater showed Trinitrotoleune (TNT) as explosive charge”.

Rifi Report

64. In March 2005, the present Head of the ISF, General Ashraf Rifi, prepared a report on the initial measures undertaken by the competent Lebanese authorities on the scene of the crime, which was submitted to the UN Fact Finding Mission. The report concluded (excerpt):

II. Measures taken:
The importance of this tragic event that led to the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri had an effect on all subsequent measures and actions taken.

A. Rescue and evacuation operations and find of bodies:
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion, security, military and civil defense organs as well as the Red Cross rushed to the crime scene to perform their duties. In spite of all the measures taken, these were, unfortunately, not up to the level that would save the face of these organs. These measures were flawed. Therefore, the Minister of Interior and Municipalities issued a memorandum 137/(sad)2, dated 25 February 2005, instructing the General Inspectorate of the Internal Security Forces to investigate the deeds and actions. Based on the results, he suggested the dismissal of both the General, Chief of Beirut Police and the General, Chief of the Judicial Police.

B. Preservation of the crime scene:
Immediately after the explosion happened, the military investigating judge was put in charge of the investigation. Al the security and judicial police personnel were put at his disposal. He gave rogatory commissions and stipulated the kind of measures to be carried out, especially the preservation of the crime scene. However, the measures taken were below the required level and contrary to the obvious fundamental basis upon which crimes as serious as this one or even less serious crimes are investigated, in which case, strict measures ought to be taken in order to prevent any tampering with the crime scene or any clues that could be used as criminal evidence to help in the investigation and uncover the truth. This could have been carried out without neglecting the humanitarian aspect of the tasks to be implemented, i.e. giving priority to finding the victims and the injured, providing the latter with the first aid in order to save them. Serious mistakes were recorded in this regard:

a) There was a state of chaos in the crime scene not only during the first few hours following the explosion, during which much focus is on extinguishing the fire, saving the injured and looking for the missing, but regrettably and unnecessarily for a much longer time.
b) There was no coordination between all the security organs present on the crime scene.
c) Looking for the missing persons was done in an irresponsible, unprofessional and careless way. Some were later found by accident or by their families. The following controversial elements were recorded:

- The body of Zahi Abu Rujaili, a Lebanese citizen, was found on 15 March 2005. According to the medical examiner, the victim had survived the explosion for approximately 12 hours.
- The body of one of the victims was found by coincidence 8 days after the explosion.
- The body of Abdel-Hameed Ghalayeeni, a Lebanese citizen, was found 16 days after the explosion by his family and not the judicial or civil defense officers.
- The fate of Farhan Ahmad Al-Issa is still unknown, he is still missing. It is feared that finding his body would constitute yet another scandal.

d) A few hours after the explosion took place, around 2300 hrs, major evidence was removed from the crime scene. The convoy cars of the late former Prime Minister were transferred to Helou Barracks under the pretext of preserving them although what was left of the cars did not justify their preservation except for their value as criminal evidence because they were the target of the explosion. This was not the only instance bearing proof of the tampering with the crime scene. A BMW car that was not part of the convoy was also removed whereas focus should have been on not removing any cars and maintaining them the way they rested after the explosion in order to determine how the crime was committed.
e) A bulldozer was introduced into the crime scene on the day of the explosion, 14 February 2005, in the evening for no justifiable reason. As soon as the Minister of Interior and Municipalities got knowledge of it, he gave orders to retrieve it and preserve the crime scene as it was.

C. The conduct of the investigation, its conditions and the determination of how the crime was committed:
a) It is common knowledge that major mistakes were made in the course of conducting the investigation, among which the leaking of information that created confusion. This in turn compromised the trustworthiness of the local investigation.
(….)

III. Responsibilities
a) Responsibility for a tragic crime such as the one we are dealing with cannot be limited to one aspect. As mentioned above, it encompasses the political, judicial and security aspects.
(….)


Decision to remove motorcade vehicles

65. The decision to fill the crater at the crime scene, to remove the motorcade vehicles and to re-open the street on the day after the blast, is confusing, assuming that there was a collective will to perform a professional crime scene examination in order to track down the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The confusion, reflected in the variety of statements from the officials most closely involved, speaks for itself.

Investigative Judge Mezher

66. At 2230 hrs on 14 February, Judge Mezher was at his home, when he got a phone call from General Naji Mulaeb, who informed the Judge that the representatives from the various agencies at the crime scene had started collecting pieces of metal from the motorcade vehicles in order to perform their own further forensic examinations. There was nothing General Mulaeb could do to stop them. He suggested that the motorcade vehicles be removed to a safe place and proposed the Helou barracks in Beirut. Judge Mezher agreed to the proposal under the following conditions. The vehicles should be filmed on the spot, they should be marked and numbered: they should also be filmed during the transportation and again upon arrival at the Helou barracks, where they should be covered and guarded around the clock in order to avoid any tampering with evidence. Judge Mezher had no information about a decision to fill the crater and reopen the street (witness statement). The vehicles were moved from the crime scene during the night of 14 February.

General Jamil Al-Sayyed

67. On the morning of 15 February 2005, General Al-Sayyed read in the newspaper about the removal of the motorcade vehicles. At 0800 hrs, he called General Ali Al-Hajj, the Head of the ISF and asked what was going on. General Al-Hajj replied that two teams were working on clearing the road which would be reopened at 1000 hrs. In response to a direct question, General Al-Hajj stated that the orders came from Mustapha Hamdan, the Commander of the Presidential Guard (witness statement).

General Ali Al-Hajj

68. On 14 February 2005 at 2230 hrs, Mr. Saddik received a telephone call at his office, (where he was with General Hisham Aouar) from the Director General of the Public Works Ministry, Mr. Fadi Nammar. Mr. Nammar told him that a decision had been taken to re-open the road the next day and that his staff were ready to start working at sunrise the next morning. The call was on the landline and was overheard by General Aouar. He claimed to be surprised about the telephone call because Mr. Nammar had no jurisdiction in the matter. It was publicly recognized that Fadi Nammar was very close to the Republican Palace, which meant that he was taking his orders from there. Mr. Nammar alleged that he had cleared the matter with the Investigative Judge. He called the acting Chief of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb, and informed him about the call from Mr. Nammar and asked him to check with Judge Mezher whether he was aware of this decision. General Mulaeb called Judge Mezher, who was aware of the decision to re-open the road and had no objection. General Mulaeb then asked what should be done with the vehicles. Judge Mezher replied that they should be brought to a secure place and proposed the Helou Barracks (witness statement).

69. The next morning, 15 February 2005, Mr. Nammar met with the Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoub Sarraf, in order to arrange for the re-opening of the Minae Al-Hosn Street. Sarraf is very close to the Republican Palace and he was also aware of the decision (witness statement).

General Hisham Aouar

70. With regard to the removal of the motorcade, General Aouar indicated that he did not know who gave the order. He was asked to assist in the filming of the removal of the motorcade on 14 February 2005 during the meeting with the Investigative Judge, but nothing else was mentioned about the removal of the motorcade vehicles from the crime scene. On that same evening, between 2230 and 2300 hrs, he was at the office of the ISF General Director, General Ali Al-Hajj, and he told him that the cars were going to be removed. He also told him that the ISF had to provide assistance by marking the locations of the vehicles and their filming (witness statement).

Director General Fadi Nammar

71. Mr. Nammar did not remember whether General Al-Hajj telephoned him on 14 February 2005, but he remembered his calling General Al-Hajj the next day, as he always did in similar situations. At the time of the telephone call, he was at the office of the Governor of Beirut. He told General Al-Hajj that they were prepared, if needed, to offer help. General Al-Hajj passed him on to a General working for ISF, who told him that there was a survey going on at the crime scene. The General stated he would come back to Mr. Nammar in due course. Mr. Nammar did not recall the name of the General, but he was with Al-Hajj. He had no authority to decide to open roads in Beirut and he did not give any orders to remove the motorcade vehicles. He also denied any contacts to the Republican Palace(witness statement).

72. Subsequently, it was confirmed (by telephone lists) that General Ali Al-Hajj made the telephone call from his landline to Mr. Nammar's mobile phone on the evening of 14 February 2005. It was also confirmed that Mr. Nammar made the telephone call to General Al-Hajj the following day (witness statement).

The Governor of Beirut, Mr. Yacoob Sarraf

73. According to his statement he did not give any instructions. The Army and the Police took over. He had telephone contact with Mr. Fadi Nammar on 14 February 2005.

Acting Commander of Beirut Police, General Naji Mulaeb

74. Between 2030 and 2200 hrs on 14 February 2005, General Mulaeb received a telephone call at his office from General Ali Al-Hajj who ordered General Mulaeb to transfer the convoy vehicles from the crime scene and secure them in a safe place, on the understanding that within two days the road would be re-opened. If experts wanted to come and inspect the vehicles, they would be available. General Mulaeb was surprised by this order and did not accept it. He told General Al-Hajj that he had nothing to do with the crime scene, since the site was under the authority of Judge Mezher. General Al-Hajj told General Mulaeb to contact the Judge, which he did. The Judge was also surprised and asked the reason for the hurry. General Mulaeb told him that he received his orders from General Al-Hajj and that he was surprised as well. The Judge told him to give him some time and that he would call back. After a while, between 10 and 30 minutes, the Judge called back and said that the cars could be transferred (witness statement).

General Mustapha Hamdan

75. After the blast on 14 February 2005, General Hamdan took all necessary measures to protect the President and the Presidential areas. He did not recall any details, but he did not go to the scene of the blast. He did not issue any orders or directives regarding the activities at the crime scene, since it did not fall within his responsibilities. Thus, he had nothing to do with any orders to clean the street, to fill the crater or to remove the motorcade vehicles (witness statement).

Head of Internal Security Forces, General Ashraf Rifi

76. In a meeting with UNIIIC on 1 June 2005, General Rifi stated that the person who gave the order to get a bulldozer or bulldozers to the crime scene to fill the hole caused by the explosion etc. was General Mustapha Hamdan, who at the time of the incident was the Commander of President Lahoud's security detail and therefore by Lebanese law had nothing to do with issues related to crime scene investigation (witness statement).

Lebanese Investigation: Ahmad Abu Adass

77. At approximately 1411 hrs on 14 February 2005, barely an hour after the explosion, Leila Bassam of Reuters received an anonymous telephone call from a man with an accent that was not Lebanese but which she could not identify. According to Ms. Bassam, as soon as she answered the call, the man directed her to “[w]rite this down,” told her to be quiet, and then read the following statement in classical Arabic:

“We, al nasra wal-jihad fee bilad Al-Sham, declare that we have meted out due punishment to the infidel Rafik Hariri so that he may be an example to others.”

The caller concluded with an Islamic religious saying and then hung up.

78. Mr. Ghassan Ben Jeddou, the Beirut Bureau chief of Al-Jazeera, recalls receiving four telephone calls that day related to the same claim of responsibility. In the first telephone call, a man whom Mr. Ben Jeddou described as speaking poor Arabic in an African, Afghan or Pakistani accent, claimed that Al-Nasra wal Jihad was responsible for Mr. Hariri's execution by a suicide bomb. Shortly thereafter, Al-Jazeera informed the public about this claim of responsibility. Al-Jazeera next received a call from another anonymous person claiming to be from the same group, this time a fluent Arabic speaker, who explained where Ben Jeddou and his colleagues could locate a videocassette containing further information about the assassination -- namely, in a tree near the ESCWA building in downtown Beirut -- and directing them to fetch the tape within 15 minutes. Mr. Ben Jeddou sent a colleague to locate the videocassette. Eventually, a white envelope containing a type-written detailed statement and a videocassette was found. After more calls from the same group asking why the tape had not yet been aired, Al-Jazeera aired the footage later that afternoon.

79. The letter accompanying the tape, purporting to be from the Nasra and Jihad Group of Greater Syria, states in part:

“Praise be to God for the banner of Nasra and Jihad is victorious in Greater Syria, and with God's blessings the agent of the infidels in Mecca and Medina, Rafik Hariri, has been meted out his due punishment through a suicide operation executed by the Mujahid Ahmad Abu Adass bearing the banner of Nasra and Jihad in Greater Syria on Monday, 14 February 2005, the 5th of Muhurram 1426 according to the Islamic Calendar, in Beirut. …. Attached is film recording of the martyr Ahmad Abu Adass, executor of the operation.”

In the tape, an individual identifying himself as Mr. Abu Adass, uses similar phraseology.

80. Soon after the airing of the tape, the Lebanese authorities had acquired extensive information about Mr. Abu Adass's background and began questioning his family and associates. Much of this information apparently came from Sheikh Ahmed Abdel-Al, of Al-Ahbash, an Islamic group active in the area of the Palestinian camps where Mr. Abu Adass had reportedly lived. Sheikh Abdel-Al stated to UNIIIC that he received a telephone call from the presidential palace shortly after the airing of the Abu Adass video, enquiring whether Abdel-Al had any information about Mr. Abu Adass. According to Mr. Abdel-Al, he obtained information about Mr. Abu Adass's background, including his address, the fact that he often went to Ein al Helwa, that he was a Wahabi, that he was well-educated, had probably studied computer science, and that he visited Abu Obeida (deputy to the leader of Jund al Sham). Sheikh Abdel-Al also obtained the names of Mr. Abu Adass' family and friends: he sent this information by facsimile to President Lahoud, Ali Hajj, Albert Karam, Jamea Jamea, and Maher al Toufeily. Sheikhh Abdel-Al reportedly also met with Syrian intelligence official, Jamea Jamea, on the evening of 14 February 2005 and gave him the information about Mr. Abu Adass, which Jamea Jamea subsequently relayed to the ISF.

81. The ISF visited Abu Abass' house, accompanied by a member of Al-Ahbash, and seized a computer, as well as a number of compact disks which were primarily of a fundamentalist Islamic nature. Although the report on the search noted that most of the documents stored on the computer were downloaded from the internet, there was no indication that Mr. Abu Adass' home had internet access. Many of Mr. Abu Adass' friends and relatives were interviewed extensively by the authorities (including by the ISF and military intelligence) in the days immediately following the explosion. Mr. Abu Adass himself, however, could not be located. On the day of the explosion 10 people were questioned and over the course of next two months approximately 40 people were interviewed. The Lebanese investigation further revealed that Mr. Abu Adass had been employed at a computer shop in the summer of 2004, which was owned in part by Sheikh Ahmed Al-Sani, who was a member of the Ahmed Miqati and Isma?l Al-Khatib network.

82. In a report dated 17 February 2005, from General Sayyed to Judge Mezher, General Sayyed concluded that the videotape was authentic and “Ahmad Abu Addas, who appears on the tape, was . . . clearly a definite participant in the assassination.” The only basis provided for this conclusion was the statement that “[t]he way in which he delivers the statement and shows himself without any covering over his face is the manner adopted by suicide bombers in similar cases. The fact that he did not conceal his face while making the statement indicates that he must have been personally responsible for setting off the explosion.” (Information About Facts Relating to the Broadcast on Al-Jazeera of a Videotape Claiming Responsibility, No. 606/A'A, 17 February 2005)

Australian Investigation

83. On 15 February 2005, a request was forwarded to the Australian Federal Police from the Prosecutor General requesting that six individuals be arrested as suspects for participating in the Hariri assassination. The responsible ISF official at Beirut International Airport, informed ISF General Al-Hajj about these six individuals. General Al-Hajj transmitted this information directly to Prosecutor General, Judge Rabia Kaddoura, who contacted the Australian authorities. The Australian investigation absolved these six suspects of any involvement in this crime, a position with which the Lebanese authorities in charge of the investigation agreed.

84. The records indicate that the Lebanese authorities based their suspicion on the following factors:

a) The six persons of interest departed from Beirut International Airport one and a half hours after the bombing occurred;
b) The six persons had no luggage; and
c) One of the six persons bore a resemblance to Mr. Abu Adass, who was depicted in a video of an extremist group that had claimed responsibility for the bombing.

85. The Australian authorities executed an extensive investigation to assist the Lebanese authorities. The investigation included raising airport alerts, interviews of the six individuals and other members of the group, explosive residual swabbing (including the individuals, their airplane seating, and their luggage), and examining the aircraft for possible explosives. Although it was reported that the six persons identified as “suspects” were without luggage, they in fact were carrying luggage. Three of the six suspects subject to a forensic examination.

86. The findings of the Australian investigation revealed: (1) The group was traveling to Jeddah as part of a religious pilgrimage; (2) No common organic or inorganic explosive or post-blast residue was detected in any of the samples taken; and (3) No person interviewed by the Australian authorities with respect to this investigation had any involvement nor any knowledge about any involvement in the Hariri assassination.

V. THE COMMISSION'S INVESTIGATION

Overview

87. UNIIIC was declared operational by the Secretary General on 16 June 2005. From 16 June to 6 October 2005, 244 witness statements, 293 investigator's notes and 22 suspect statements have been issued. A number of searches have been conducted and 453 crime scene exhibits have been seized. A total of 16,711 pages of documents have been produced. Thirty investigators from 17 different nations have been involved in the UNIIIC investigative measures, as well as external experts.

88. At the outset, the time factor affecting the Commission has to be emphasized. UNIIIC was declared operational four months after the actual crime, which means that the perpetrators and their accomplices have had plenty of time to destroy evidence and/or to collude with each other, the ability to recall of potential witnesses has been diminished, and previous omissions and inadvertent or deliberate loss and destruction of evidence could not be undone.

89. The first month after the Secretary-General declared UNIIIC operational was focused on updating the investigators on the current status of the investigation, including an assessment of measures undertaken by the Lebanese authorities. Much time was spent on analysis of material handed over to the Commission by the Prosecutor General, followed by interviews for clarification with key witnesses, based on written materials on the following topics:

- Reconstruction of actions and whereabouts of Mr. Hariri prior to the blast.
- Findings and results from activities by the Lebanese authorities undertaken at the crime scene and adjacent areas.
- Tampering with evidence.
- Road works at the scene prior to the blast.
- The Abu Adass track
- The Mitsubishi Canter van
- Collection and analysis of telephone lists
- Collection and analysis of CCTV-material, videos and photos collected from a diversity set of possessors depicting the scene prior to and after the blast.
- Financial transactions.

90. These measures in turn led to new witnesses. A public information “hot line” was installed on which anybody could approach the Commission about the case: this measure resulted in several new interviews and new clues that needed to be followed up.

91. The compilation and organization of files and evidence was time-consuming, involving maintaining and improving the system for storing and recording evidence, which includes thousands of pages of documents and written testimonies, as well as numerous videos and photographs. Legal issues highlighted the need for research into Lebanese criminal law and procedure in order to ensure the proper protocols for searches, arrests, suspect interviews, and charging documents. The Lebanese authorities' assistance in these matters was very praiseworthy.

92. The second month was characterized by a change in investigative directions and priorities, in the sense that investigators followed up new clues and tracked down new witnesses based on their conclusions from previous measures and professional analysis. Many different sources approached the Commission and provided the investigation with useful information. The vast majority of senior officials in the involved Lebanese authorities were interviewed to clarify the allotment of competencies, chains-of-command, and their extent of involvement, as well as decisions taken (or which were neglected). During this period of time the support base of the Commission was reinforced and new software programmes were installed, which made the data-base more operational.

93. During the third month, a full scale crime scene examination was conducted by a joint Dutch / British / Japanese expert team at the site itself and in adjacent areas, including the sea floor adjacent to the scene of the blast. The aim of this operation was to find physical evidence at the crime scene, to reconstruct the improvised explosive device (IED) used and to identify the Mitsubishi Canter van. The operation was accomplished in situ during September.

Planning of the Assassination

94. During all measures and efforts undertaken by the UNIIIC, no new hard leads or traces regarding the motive and reason for assassinating Mr. Hariri have emerged to supplement those which can be attributed to events during the second half of 2004 which culminated in Mr. Hariri's decision to step down as the Prime Minister and the prognosis of the outcome of the general elections in Lebanon. Strong indicators on the latter matter are the massive Future Party election campaign; the Lebanese authorities' reaction on the olive oil affair, in February 2005, where the distributors were arrested (by the Lebanese authorities while distributing free olive at the behest of Mr. Hariri) (investigator notes): and last but not least the factual outcome of the elections. New witnesses have approached the Commission who were reluctant to have any contacts with the Lebanese authorities due to lack of confidence, stating that the assassination of the former Prime Minister could not have occurred without the knowledge of the Lebanese authorities and the approval from Syria.

95. The structure and organization of the Syrian and Lebanese intelligence services in Lebanon at the time of the blast, including protocols for reporting, shows a pervasive impact on everyday life in Lebanon. Good examples of this are documents collected from the former Syrian Intelligence post, Villa Jabr, at Bologna Forest, Lebanon and an intercepted telephone conversation between General Ghazali and a prominent Lebanese official on 19 July 2004, at 0945 hrs (excerpt):

“Ghazali:I know it is early but I thought we should keep up you posted. The President of the Republic told me this morning that they are two to rule the country the Prime Minister and him. He said that things cannot continue this way. The Prime Minister is always irritating him and we are always shutting him up and yelling at him. He made it clear he cannot continue this way.
(...)
X: Take it easy on me. Can you appoint a new Government at this time?

Ghazali: Yes we can appoint one. What could be the problem? We can name Botros Harb.
(…)
Ghazali: Let me tell you one thing. Let the worker's movement take the street on the 20th in Solidere and Koraytem.

X: Let's speak it over. Take it easily. I have to take into consideration the best interests of Syrian and Lebanon.

Ghazali: We are keen on Syria's best interest but I am now talking about Rafik Hariri.

X: So, the decision is taken.

Ghazali: I wish to tell you one thing. Whenever we need to speak to Hariri we have to suck up to him and he does not always answer.

X: To hell with him. What do I care about him?

Ghazali: What do I care about him? The President can't stand him so why should I?

X: Fine, may he rot in hell …
(…)
Ghazali: No. Let him be the laughing stock and be pointed at as the person who ruined and indebted the country. Let the people take the street in Koraytem and Solidere; let the manifestations continue until he is forced to resign like a dog.

X: What about another option. I send him a message saying: Resign God damn it.

Ghazali: No, don't send him a message or else he will say they forced me to resign. Let the street … you know what I mean. Or else he will use this as a bargaining card with his American and French masters.

X: So shall we leave things to the street?

Ghazali: This is better.
X: Let's go for it.”

96. One witness of Syrian origin but resident in Lebanon, who claims to have worked for the Syrian intelligence services in Lebanon, has stated that approximately two weeks after the adoption of Security Council resolution 1559, senior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri. He claimed that a senior Lebanese security official went several times to Syria to plan the crime, meeting once at the Meridian Hotel in Damascus and several times at the Presidential Place and the office of a senior Syrian security official. The last meeting was held in the house of the same senior Syrian security official approximately seven to 10 days before the assassination and included another senior Lebanese security official. The witness had close contact with high ranked Syrian officers posted in Lebanon.

97. At the beginning of January 2005, one of the high ranked officers told the witness that Rafik Hariri was a big problem to Syria. Approximately a month later the officer told the witness that there soon would be an “earthquake” that would re-write the history of Lebanon.

98. The witness visited several Syrian military bases in Lebanon. At one such base, in Hammana, he observed a white Mitsubishi van, with a white tarpaulin over the flatbed. The observations were made on 11, 12 and 13 February 2005. The Mitsubishi left the Military base in Hammana on the morning of 14 February 2005. The Mitsubishi Canter van, which was used as the bomb carrier, entered Lebanon from Syria through the Bekaa border and a military hot lane on 21 January 2005, at 1320 hrs. It was driven by a Syrian Colonel from the Army Tenth Division.

99. On 13 February 2005, the witness drove one of the Syrian officers to the St. George area in Beirut on a reconnaissance exercise, as he subsequently understood it to have been after the assassination took place.

100. Regarding Mr. Abu Adass, the witness has stated that he played no role in the crime except as a decoy. He was detained in Syria and forced at gunpoint to record the video tape. Subsequently, he was killed in Syria. The videotape was sent to Beirut on the morning of 14 February 2005, and handed over to Jamil Al Sayyed. A civilian with a criminal record and an officer from the Sûreté Générale were tasked with putting the tape somewhere in Hamra and then calling Ghassan Ben Jeddo, an Al-Jazeera TV reporter.

101. General Jamil Al-Sayyed, according to the witness, cooperated closely with General Mustapha Hamdan and General Raymond Azar in the preparation of the assassination of Mr. Hariri. He also coordinated with General Ghazali (and, among others, people from Mr. Ahmad Jibreel in Lebanon). General Hamdan and General Azar provided logistical support, providing money, telephones, cars, walkie-talkies, pagers, weapons, ID-cards etc. Those who knew of the crime in advance were among others, Nasser Kandil and General Ali Al-Hajj.

102. Fifteen minutes before the assassination, the witness was in the vicinity of the St. George area. He received a telephone call from one of the senior Syrian officers, who asked the witness where he was. When he answered, he got the advice to leave the area immediately.

103. Another witness approached the Commission and stated that he had met with General Hamdan in the middle of October 2004. General Hamdan talked very negatively about Mr. Hariri accusing him of being pro-Israeli. General Hamdan ended the conversation by stating: “We are going to send him on a trip, bye, bye Hariri”. After the assassination, the witness was strongly reminded not to discuss this conversation with anyone.

104. Another “witness” who later became a suspect, Zuhir Ibn Mohamed Said Saddik, has given detailed information to the Commission about the crime, in particular insofar as the pla